



Name: \_\_\_\_\_

# SPREADING DRILLS WORKSHEET

With the card below, practice reading the card in three different ways. First, with a pen in your mouth. Then, insert a word in between every word in the card. Finally, read the card backwards.

## Economic decline causes global nuclear war.

Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino-US peace," International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino-US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of **nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence** may **reduce the risk of war between major powers**. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that **interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict** are right. **Interdependence raises the cost of conflict** for all sides **but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations** may **generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that** in turn **increase the risk of military conflict** (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, **decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations**. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. **If leaders** on either side of the Atlantic **begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation's decline** then **they may blame** this on **external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain** respect or **credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and** ultimately **refuse to be deterred by** either **nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly**, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions **in East Asia** are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. **The greatest risk is not** that **a territorial dispute** leads to war under present circumstances **but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious**. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. **This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility**: one of the two **great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional** limited **war**, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

Now, create your own spreading schedule!

---

---

---

---