



TRIUMPH DEBATE

SUPPLEMENTAL FILE

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER LD TOPIC
**RESOLVED: A JUST GOVERNMENT OUGHT
TO RECOGNIZE AN UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT
OF WORKERS TO STRIKE.**

Triumph Debate Supplement File

Table of Contents

Triumph Supplement – November/December 1

Affirmative Cards..... 3

 Digital Work 4

 A/2 Specific Strike Bad..... 21

Negative Cards 31

 Right to Work..... 32

 A/2 Strikes / Unions..... 42



Features:

- 6-8 hours of instruction per day
- Prep and practice on Jan/Feb topic
- Traditional & progressive LD divisions
- Starter evidence files, drill sessions & practice rounds
- National champion coaches and instructors

Affirmative Cards

Digital Work

Uber and other gig apps are being protested now due to their poverty wages. When including the costs that their workers take on, they are not able to thrive, and only collective bargaining rights can resolve this issue.

Dickey, '21 [Megan Rose Dickey is a senior reporter at Protocol covering labor and diversity in tech. Prior to joining Protocol, she was a senior reporter at TechCrunch and a reporter at Business Insider, Published: 7/21/21, "'Poverty is not flexibility': Gig workers strike over labor practices", Protocol, <https://www.protocol.com/meta-haptic-gloves>] /Triumph Debate

Gig workers across the country staged a protest and strike today in response to Uber, Lyft and other companies' labor practices. At the rally in San Francisco, drivers spoke about the issues with California's Proposition 22 and urged the passage of the PRO Act. "I came here to fight to be able to unionize," Ibrahim Diallo, a rideshare driver in the San Francisco Bay Area, told Protocol. "It's unbelievable that we are not allowed to form a union." In San Francisco, Diallo and at least 50 other drivers and supporters led a caravan to one of Uber's offices in the city. Statewide, about 1,000 workers committed to going on strike, according to Rideshare Drivers United. Erica Mighetto, a San Francisco Bay Area-based rideshare driver and organizer with RDU, told Protocol she wanted to "expose Prop. 22 for the lie and the fraud that it is." Proposition 22 went into law earlier this year in California after Instacart, Uber, Lyft and other gig-economy companies spent \$224 million convincing voters to pass the initiative. **Prop. 22 was a direct response to the passage of AB 5, the California law that strictly limits when companies can hire workers as contractors. During the campaign, gig-economy companies said Prop. 22 would give app-based workers a variety of benefits while maintaining the flexibility of being an independent contractor. "That is absolutely untrue," Mighetto said of maintaining flexibility. "Drivers at SFO are now making 36 cents per mile. Poverty is not flexibility."** Mighetto also said up to 80% of driver fares are going directly to Uber and Lyft. When Mighetto began driving four years ago, Lyft only took a 20% cut, she said. "That number has doubled three, four times now," she said. A recent Mission Local analysis supports some of Mighetto's claims. **In 10 rides with Uber and 10 rides with Lyft, drivers made an average of 52% of customer fares,** according to the report. **Uber, however, disputes that claim. In Q1 2021, Uber reported its mobility take rate was 21.5%. That is the "average percentage of the total amount riders paid that went to Uber," the company's head of work communications, Matt Wing, explained over email. "I would also note that individual trips don't show how much Uber drivers are really earning because they don't include incentives and don't accurately reflect the total earnings drivers get," Wing wrote. The median earnings per hour for drivers are \$25.28 in San Francisco and \$26.85 in Los Angeles, according to Uber. However, those earnings do not take into account expenses such as insurance and gas.** Lyft did not explicitly comment on Mighetto's claims, but referred Protocol to a blog post of how Lyft calculates pay. The blog post, however, does not detail the company's take rate. Beyond the wages, Mighetto said Uber's deactivation policies are another example of a lack of flexibility. "Some drivers are just arbitrarily deactivated, for even such a menial claim that they're not wearing a mask," Mighetto said. "And these are untrue and false claims that they're losing their jobs over." Mighetto added that many voters and drivers were under the impression that workers would receive health insurance plans under Prop. 22. The measure does state that workers are eligible for healthcare subsidies to be applied toward Covered California insurance plans. However, the advertisements during the Prop. 22 campaign did not include all of the pertinent details. **Workers have protested Prop. 22's health care benefits policies before. In May, We Drive Progress and other organizations demanded that gig-economy companies automatically provide health insurance stipends to all workers who meet the minimum time requirements. Under Prop. 22, companies can require gig workers to apply for these benefits. Rideshare Drivers United is also advocating for the passage of the PRO Act, which is currently in Congress. "We think the PRO Act is the only way to sort of chip**

away at the injustice that's being propagated by Proposition 22," Mighetto said. The PRO Act would alter the definition of "employee" in order to broaden the number of people who are covered by the National Labor Relations Act, which protects the rights of employees and encourages participation in collective bargaining

If the PRO Act becomes law, the NLRA would use the test outlined in AB 5 to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. That test looks at whether the person is free from the employer's control, does work that is outside the scope of the company's normal business operations, and conducts similar work independently and outside the context of the employer. That test would likely result in the classification of gig workers as employees, **Rey Fuentes, a Skadden Fellow at the Partnership for Working Families, previously told Protocol. "The PRO Act essentially reverses that and says that none of these workers should be presumed employees but we should determine whether or not they are independent contractors or employers by using the ABC test," Fuentes said in April. "And that ABC test would likely result in their designation as an employee."**

The gig economy expanded due to a lack of job options, but as it grew, workers were no longer trained in order to have the skills necessary for long term economic performance. We must alter worker protections to ensure that short term profits don't trump long term welfare concerns.

Friedman, '14 [Gerald Carl Friedman is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Published: April 2014, "Workers without employers: Shadow corporations and the rise of the gig economy", Review of Keynesian Economics, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gerald-Friedman-2/publication/276191257_Workers_without_employers_Shadow_corporations_and_the_rise_of_the_gig_economy/links/5731c7bf08ae6cca19a3081f/Workers-without-employers-Shadow-corporations-and-the-rise-of-the-gig-economy.pdf] /Triumph Debate

Some prefer gigs to jobs. Some relish the freedom from commitments to an employer, not having to go to an office; they are said to consider themselves the Pajama Generation, ambling 'out of bed in the morning in our PJs and fire up the Mac' (Brenoff 2010). Young people are supposed to be too entrepreneurial for 'Dad's' old-type- career. They want to strike out on their own, to form their own start-ups, forge their own paths (Pofeldt 2013; Ryan 2012;). Others value the flexibility to be home at odd hours to care for children or to fulfill other family responsibilities. **Few of the workers in the gig economy actually enjoy this happy life-style. The relatively well-paid independent contractors are happy with their alternative arrangement, but solid majorities of workers in the other categories of contingent workers would prefer traditional jobs** (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005, tables 10 and 11). It may be that even more would prefer a traditional job today than in 2005 after economic recession pushed many workers out of traditional jobs into positions as independent contractors and other 'entrepreneurial' vocations. **While workers become independent contractors from choice in good times, such as the late 1990s, in the recession years since 2000, companies have turned jobs into gigs, often renegeing on informal commitments to reward senior workers for long job tenure. While many younger workers have been disappointed that they have been unable to find the secure employment that their parents had held, entry into the new gig economy has been a shock for many older, senior workers. Such was the experience, for example, of the editorial staff of Out magazine in 2012, when they were discharged and invited to apply to do their work as employees of an independent contractor established by the magazine's editor, a company with one client: Out** (Pompeo 2012). Discharge followed by rehiring as independent contract labor has become so routine that CBS news ran a story called: 'The Companies that Laid You Off? They Want You Back, Sort Of' (Ceci Rodgers, MoneyWatch, March, 2010). It may not be coincidental that the gig economy has expanded during the worst recession since the 1930s. **Long-term contracts were a way for companies to protect themselves from labor shortage during times of low unemployment. While a bad strategy when unemployment is low, it becomes irresistible when there are many looking for work and spot-market wages are low. Without loyal workers and long-term contracts, tied to short-term labor markets, shadow corporations are more vulnerable to the macroeconomy; they benefit from low labor costs during recessions but are forced to pay dramatically more for workers during booms.** Hiring labor on the spot market, they need a reserve army of the unemployed available to work at stable wages. **If we returned to full employment, they might find it hard to locate workers who are ready-to-work: healthy, trained, and imbued with enough intrinsic sense of responsibility that they will work without promise of future reward. Short-sighted managers may not care about the loss of corporate identity and team spirit that was used to build companies. When unemployment remains high, companies like Out can replace regular workers with outside contractors to lower labor costs without giving up access to experienced**

and trained workers. Over time, however, if companies hire short-term they will not be reproducing their workforce training and acculturation.

The gigification of the economy is harming both the worker and the employer. We need to find new ways to create protections throughout the economy to bolster the ability of workers to thrive.

Friedman, '14 [Gerald Carl Friedman is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Published: April 2014, "Workers without employers: Shadow corporations and the rise of the gig economy", Review of Keynesian Economics, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gerald-Friedman-2/publication/276191257_Workers_without_employers_Shadow_corporations_and_the_rise_of_the_gig_economy/links/5731c7bf08ae6cca19a3081f/Workers-without-employers-Shadow-corporations-and-the-rise-of-the-gig-economy.pdf] /Triumph Debate

The rise of gig employment threatens our system of income security where social insurance is provided through employment in traditional jobs. This system was built on an earlier capitalist initiative, the efforts by welfare capitalists to discourage labor unrest or labor mobility by linking workers with their employment. Unemployment insurance, workers' compensation and disability insurance, health insurance, and many retirement pensions are all linked with employment, provided as an added benefit to workers. These are benefits that go with holding a job; they are withdrawn if workers leave a particular employment. Behind this system of employer-based social insurance is a social safety net that is increasingly frayed. After a lay-off, workers receive unemployment insurance if they have had a traditional job for enough of the past year and they may be eligible to buy into their health insurance through the COBRA program. Apart from this employment-based insurance, the unemployed may be eligible for safety-net programs like food stamps and health insurance through Medicaid; and they can go to food banks and beg on the streets. Programs that in the past gave support to the poor, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and General Relief have been drastically scaled back since the 1980s. **The combination of gig employments and cutbacks in general social support means that Americans now experience dramatically more income fluctuation than in the past** (Hacker 2010). **As a country, we could have mitigated much of the last decades' rise in inequality and income instability with a system of social insurance providing universal benefits available to all; or we could have provided these benefits through unions, as is done with unemployment insurance in Scandinavia** (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rodgers 1998). **Instead, we have continued to rely on a system of employer-sponsored benefits, a system established by businesses to ward off both unions and social reformers, reinforcing the market by rewarding workers for holding good jobs and maintaining long job tenure** (Klein 2003; Lichtenstein 2002; Quadagno 2006). A system of employment-based social insurance has little space for workers on gigs. **Few gig workers are protected by federal labor laws; the National Labor Relations Act, the Americans with Disability Act, and other basic protective legislation have no place for the self-employed and little for part-time and contract workers. States provide little protection; few offer unemployment insurance benefits for workers employed part-time or for the self-employed** (General Accounting Office 2000). Not only do gig workers miss the cash value of any employer-provided benefits (including health insurance and workers' compensation), they lose the employer subsidy for social security (including the employer share of social security retirement and Medicare as well as unemployment insurance premiums). **When they buy insurance or pension coverage as individuals, the cost is much higher than the group plans offered by large employers.' Gig workers also miss many of the workplace public goods provided as a natural part of stable employments. Where they work alongside traditional workers in factories, offices, or shops, some gig workers can benefit from some employment-based benefits, such as health and safety regulations. Many part-time university instructors, for example, have safe offices and lecture halls because they work in the same facilities as do**

regular tenure-track faculty. Even these gig workers are at a disadvantage, however, because their precarious employment situation makes them reluctant to bring complaints to their supervisors and employers. More vulnerable still are those who are hired without a place in an established workplace, a group that not only includes those running their own businesses, like musicians, jewelry makers, and caterers working out of their homes, but also many consultants, delivery workers, freelance researchers, writers, and editorial workers. Responsible for their own workplaces, working out of their bedrooms and neighborhood Starbucks, they are denied the protection of OSHA or other health and safety regulation.⁴ **Not to mention such matters as holiday pay, sick days, or disability or any other form of social insurance. At times, the use of gig labor not only threatens health but undermines productivity growth. Employers can also lose because workplaces filled with gig workers become less productive when individual workers fail to develop skills through productive social connections.** **Thirty years ago, for example, copyeditors helped each other become better workers when they worked together in the offices of newspapers or publishing houses. Today, however, most publishers hire freelancers scattered throughout the country (or the world). For the gig freelancers, working at home (or in a coffee shop) opens work opportunities with flexible hours, and allows them to work without moving. The price of this opportunity, however, is that workers and the employer lose the benefits of workplace public goods.** Employment contracts can be individual, but workplaces are inherently public. Both workplace safety and productive conviviality are available to all in an office but are difficult, or impossible, to produce for workers scattered over the globe. Outside of office settings, freelance copyeditors struggle to carve ergonomic worksites out of crowded homes, or coffee shops. **And the experience of working near other freelance gig workers at a Starbucks is no substitute for that of copyeditors at a publishing house like Norton who could talk together informally about language and other editing issues.'** **Employers as well as workers lose when the physical dispersal of production comes at the cost of the public good of shared experience and learning.**

Strikes by contract workers have succeeded in the past, but have relied on times on government intervention. A right to strike is necessary to help preserve their quality of life.

Poon, '18 [Teresa Shuk-Ching is a Project Research Fellow, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei, Taiwan, Published Online: 6/5/18, "Independent Workers: Growth Trends, Categories, and Employee Relations Implications in the Emerging Gig Economy", Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10672-018-9318-8>] /Triumph Debate

While the employment status of this new category of independent workers is still a subject of on-going debate, it is clear for many to see a recent trend of on-demand workers, who have found their wages and conditions of work unacceptable, involved in collective actions against the platform companies to bargain for the provision of better employment terms and workers' protection (Healy et al. 2017). **Drivers (riders) of Deliveroo, an App-enabled platform company operating in London, undertook a wildcat strike in 2016 to oppose the company's imposition of unilateral change to their contract, adjusting the pay structure from an hourly wage of £7 plus an additional £1 per delivery to a piece rate of £3.75 per drop** (Cant 2017a). Such a change in pay structure offered the food delivery platform company a higher degree of flexibility at the expense of the drivers whose pay was no longer guaranteed. **They had to wait for long hours, competed for orders, but could still end up with their level of average wages significantly lower** (Magee 2016). Represented by the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB), Deliveroo drivers put forward three demands, bargaining for a higher rate (£5) per drop, a hiring freeze, and no trade union activists' victimization (Cant 2017a). **In the end, concessions were made by Deliveroo to the drivers, guaranteeing pay for the peak hours and allowing drivers to opt-in to, rather than opt-out of, the new payment scheme which replaced the guaranteed time rate by the non-guaranteed piece-rate that could have an adverse impact to the earnings of the drivers** (Magee 2016). **The strike undertaken by Deliveroo's riders has become a landmark incident in the emerging gig economy as it has a demonstration effect for on-demand workers registered with other food delivery platform companies, encouraging them to band together and engaging in collective actions in cases of unfair and unacceptable treatment. Similar strikes spread from Deliveroo to UberEats, and to Foodora, from London to other cities across the U.K, and to other countries including Italy, Spain, France and Germany** (Cant 2017b). Trade unions and political parties in different countries were increasingly involved in the disputes between the on-demand workers and the platform companies for which they worked. **Some governments also intervened, as in the case of Deliveroo's driver strike, to clarify the employment status of the on-demand workers concerned. These on-demand workers were taken by the U.K. government as "employees" rather than the "self-employed" because they were de facto workers employed by a company and should therefore be entitled to receive at least a wage not lower than the national minimum** (Magee 2016). While there has been a phenomenal level of growth of independent workers, especially in developed countries, these workers are usually not considered as employees having established any kind of employment relationship with the companies using their services. Independent workers are therefore seldom the subject matter to be examined by employee relations academics. **The emergence of a new category of independent workers assuming the episodic on-demand work, mediated by platform companies, could be a springboard encouraging employee relations scholars to pay more attention to the rights and the responsibilities of this new type of worker** (Stewart and Stanford 2017). The fragmented nature of on-demand work has very much weakened the power of this category of independent workers, who are in no position to engage in any kind of effort-wage bargain, as the platform companies are in full control of the coordination platforms and the algorithms used in the

process of distributing work for matching workers with the orders (Cant 2017b). **Labor costs, such as those related to the buying and maintaining of a vehicle to perform on-demand work, are absorbed by independent workers. Other costs of employing workers, such as workers' insurance expenses and sick days' payments, are not borne by the platform companies as on-demand workers are taken by them as equivalent to the self-employed who are not entitled to various kinds of employment protection** (Magee 2016; Cant 2017a).

Gig workers have been forced to organize without union support and been fired due to attempts to strike to improve their work conditions. A right to strike for all workers is necessary to ensure that they are able to continue their political action.

Tassinari & Maccarrone, '17 [Arianna Tassinari is a Senior Researcher, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Vincenzo Maccarrone is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Smurfit School of Business, University College Dublin, Published: 8/10/17, "The mobilisation of gig economy couriers in Italy: some lessons for the trade union movement", European Review of Labour and Research, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1024258917713846?casa_token=pGXglEuU5IYAAAA:DcUXjA19Mb7Vugytr-rBdf8TqYRE-VyMmzLJ8s8hMA2Wke4yCKHpOMYNsOnUIH_AVtALciM24Bfe] /Triumph Debate

Outside the traditional mobilisation repertoires Up to September 2016, the riders had been autonomously self-organising their mobilisation without the support of established trade unions. As the dispute with the company escalated, the riders then sought the support of the rank-and-file independent union SI-COBAS, active in the mobilisation of workers in the traditional Italian logistics sector (Pradella and Cillo, 2015). Through the union, they presented their demands formally to the firm. When these remained unmet a week later, they launched the protest on 8 October 2016. **The mobilisation was organised as a 'proto-strike': the riders involved 'unlogged' from the app and encouraged others to do the same, thus impacting the company's capacity to fulfil its orders. They then staged visible protests around the city with their bikes and flags, holding 'flying pickets' that went through restaurants and squares handing out flyers to restaurant owners and members of the public, inviting them to boycott the app. This was coordinated with an online campaign targeting the company's social media pages with critical comments, aimed at negatively affecting its reputation.** These protest methods fell mostly outside the traditional repertoire of trade unions' mobilisation tactics, resembling instead some of the practices adopted by the Italian precarious workers' movements in the early 2000s (Mattoni, 2012). Indeed, **the workers involved in the protest have stated in interviews that the role played by the SI-COBAS union in the mobilisation had been limited, and that they had largely relied on the experiences of mobilisation acquired through involvement in other social movements.**⁴ The October 2016 mobilisation attracted considerable coverage in the Italian media and the company suffered further reputational damage through its attempts to defend its employment practices, claiming that the work of the riders was not 'real work', but 'an opportunity to cycle around, whilst gaining a small salary'.⁵ Outcomes and aftermath of the October protest **After refusing to negotiate, following the increased media attention the company agreed to meet some of the protesters' representatives.** In response to the workers' demands, the company increased the delivery fee from €2.70 to €3.60, and offered some discount agreements for bike repairs. These concessions, extracted through mobilisation, are not to be disregarded as irrelevant. **Yet, the more substantial demands remained unmet. Foodora refused to reinstate hourly wages and to reclassify its riders as employees. In addition, the 15 riders that had been most active in the protest claim to have been 'unlogged' from the system and denied any more shifts, effectively being subject to the involuntary termination of their contractual relationship.**⁶ The availability of a large pool of labour allowed the firm easily to hire new workers, thus diluting the unity of the original core of protesters. Riders have also reported that the firm subsequently optimised its work organisation model so that most workers could get on average two deliveries per hour at peak times, an earnings' level which placated some of the initial discontent.⁷ The company's strategy of waiting out the storm was seemingly successful, at least in the short run, in weakening the intensity of the riders' mobilisation. The protest had noticeable ripple effects, however. **The Italian**

left-wing opposition party Sinistra Italiana has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to introduce a law to re-regulate employment practices in the gig economy by re-classifying as subordinate employment relationships those cases where workers are hired as parasubordinate contractors but are, de facto, subject to the control and direction of the firm as regards the timing, organisation and remuneration of their work.⁸ Given the limited progress achieved so far on the legislative front, a group of former Foodora workers are now preparing to pursue legal avenues and sue the company, aiming to demonstrate that their engagement as parasubordinate contractors masked a subordinate employment relationship, and that the cancellation of their shifts amounted thus to illegitimate dismissal. **Meanwhile, the riders are continuing their self-organisation efforts, raising awareness about employment practices in the sector and forging links with other workers. However, established Italian trade unions have remained absent from these attempts at collective organisation.**

Current policies are failing workers. They do not want to grant them full labor protections and are solidifying their second-class status within the current labor regime.

Greenhouse, '21 [Steven Greenhouse is a journalist with The Guardian who focuses on labor and the workplace, Published: 5/27/21, "Unionized but impotent? Row erupts over gig workers' labor proposal", The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/27/gig-workers-unionized-but-impotent-new-york-bill>] /Triumph Debate

A huge controversy has erupted among labor unions after several unions joined with Uber and Lyft to develop legislation in New York state that would deliver on one of labor's major goals: giving many gig workers a quick path to unionization.

The legislation would make good on another labor objective: allowing industrywide bargaining for gig workers, specifically the roughly 250,000 app-based drivers and food delivery workers in New York. But many union officials and worker advocates have denounced the legislation, saying it comes at too steep a price. The legislation falls short of labor's goal of defining these gig workers as employees, a move that would give them protections under minimum wage and anti-discrimination laws. They also complain that the legislation contains language that would prohibit app-based drivers and delivery workers from going on strike. Critics further assert that the legislation would undermine labor's No 1 goal nationwide: getting Congress to enact the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (Pro Act), a bill that would make it considerably easier to unionize workers. The chief author of the New York legislation, state senator Diane Savino, a former union official herself, said she was eager to find a way to unionize gig workers and improve their lives. **"We want to focus on the people who are most at risk in the gig economy – the ride-sharing people and the delivery workers,"** Savino told the Guardian.

Savino, who represents parts of Brooklyn and Staten Island, said she backed the Pro Act and in no way wanted to undermine it. The main union behind the legislation, the International Association of Machinists, argues that the bill would be a bridge to the Pro Act. "This helps with the Pro Act," said Brendan Sexton, executive director of the Independent Drivers Guild, an arm of the Machinists that reached a deal with Uber in 2016 to represent Uber drivers in New York City. (Uber provides money to help finance the group.) "When the Pro Act passes, we'll already have 250,000 workers in a union who know what it means to get the benefits of a union and the collective voice of a union," Sexton said. "When you ask critics, what is the best way to lift the voices of gig workers, how will you give them worker power, they're silent."

State senator Jessica Ramos, who represents a district in Queens with many immigrants and many app-based drivers and delivery workers, opposes the legislation. "It really breaks my heart to see how my neighbors were completely left out of a deal where the companies decided that they would somehow be deemed second-class workers under the law." Ramos, who chairs the senate labor committee, said she would seek to block the legislation, which supporters hope will be enacted before the legislature adjourns on 10 June. Ramos said: "There is no way on earth that New York will go to the right of Joe Biden on a worker issue. We can't undermine the Pro Act. We cannot be complicit in helping Uber and Uber Eats in creating a carve-out of the Pro Act."

The Pro Act would make it far easier to classify Uber and Lyft drivers and delivery workers as employees. The New York legislation seeks to walk a tightrope, with tech companies arguing that gig workers are independent contractors and not employees, the legislation does not define them in either group, instead calling them "network workers". Under federal law, employees have a right to unionize, but independent contractors do not.

The gig workers' bill would give New York's imprimatur toward their unionizing and help them surmount any complaints that they are violating antitrust laws by conspiring to set pay and benefit levels. **Under the legislation, once the drivers' union or delivery workers' union reaches an agreement with the industry, a five-person state board would decide whether to adopt those recommendations. Under the legislation, once 10% of the state's app-based drivers or delivery workers sign cards supporting a union, that union would be designated the exclusive bargaining agent for all the drivers or delivery workers in the state. To finance the unions, the legislation calls for a 10-**

cent fee per ride or delivery, generating tens of millions of dollars annually for a union. Bhairavi Desai, co-founder of the New York Taxi Workers Alliance, a union that represents 15,000 taxi drivers, said: "There's so much wrong with this legislation. What it fundamentally does is relegate drivers to be second class on every level of labor law, from wages to safety to bargaining rights. In fact, on wages and unemployment, it rolls back rights that we've painfully won." **Savino says the legislation would provide better workers' compensation and unemployment insurance coverage for gig workers, but critics note that the legislation would let gig companies pay less than half of what other companies pay toward unemployment insurance.**

Uber and other gig apps have constructed a system where their workers are constantly surveilled, while also removing the ability of escaping the cycle of poverty due to low wages and a bonus system that requires constant work to even break even with living expenses.

Moore, '18 [Phoebe V. Moore is an Associate Professor in Political Economy and Technology at the University of Leicester's School of Business, Published: 2018, "the Threat of Physical and Psychosocial Violence and Harassment in Digitalized Work", International Labour Organization, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_617062.pdf] /Triumph Debate

Offline gig work is also on the rise. It is obtained by platforms like Uber or Deliveroo, where the organization of the labour process is digitalized (Tassinari and Maccarrone, 2017a) but is carried out physically, like taxi driving; bicycle and motor scooter delivery services of food and packages; construction; and repair work (De Stefano, 2016, p. 3; Huws, Spencer and Joyce, 2016, p. 2). **Driving work sits within the category of transport workers, and these workers already regularly encounter violence and harassment, as is pointed out by the International Transport Workers' Federation** (ITWF 2017; see also Pillinger 2017, p. 12). Delivery drivers and cyclists have been tracked for many years, and the introduction of satellite technologies have allowed this tracking practice to become ever more intrusive. **One UPS driver told Harper's magazine that the employer uses new metrics as a "mental whip", noting that "people get intimidated and work faster"** (The Week, 2015; Kaplan, 2015). **Risks of PPVH are exacerbated by the ways that apps intensify the rate of work through joining drivers with customers by algorithm, a prescriptive DMM. There are more women driving taxis with the Uber application (app) than in other taxi services** (Harris and Krueger, 2016, p. 8), **meaning they increasingly face risks alongside existing risks of sexual harassment and violence.** Management by app/algorithm reduces drivers' abilities to make choices about work based on personal fatigue or concern for safety. Drivers are at risk of deactivation, or being temporarily or permanently laid off on the basis of customer ratings. **There is less data-driven evidence of risks in offline gig work than there is in online gig work, potentially because access to the relevant groups is difficult — for example, cases where Uber drivers are explicitly forbidden from speaking negatively about the company according to signed contracts.** Trade union and academic researchers have successfully accessed online gig workers by making contacts as "clients" via the platforms themselves. A researcher at the Center for Labour Relations, National Research Council of Argentina, has actively motivated motor scooter delivery drivers to organize. He outlined the risks of PPVH faced by taxi and delivery driver gig workers. **Because DMMs in offline gig work impose very high targets and workers are only paid per delivery/passenger, people drive too quickly and put themselves at risk of accidents and fines. There is a high rate of psychological violence that arises from the inability of the drivers to earn enough money.** Further, there have been issues with local **police and cases of bribery.** Nastiti has carried out research with gig work taxi drivers in Indonesia. Her findings show that Go-Jek drivers experience high rates of "super-exploitation" (Marini, as cited in Nastiti, 2017a, p. 2). **Drivers may have, in principle, free will to turn off the app used to locate clients. However, as soon as a driver turns the app on, they are controlled by it, where orders are assigned and acceptance expected.** **There is a minimum acceptance rate, meaning drivers are not actually in a position to turn down work if they have not met the quota.** Furthermore, the driver rate, or USD 0.07 to USD 0.14 per kilometer for motorcycle taxis, is not enough for daily living expenses, drivers rely on **the daily bonus that is only available if drivers have met minimum requirements.** Nastiti's research

indicates that the narrative around obtaining taxi driving work in Indonesia focuses on formalization, emphasizing the importance of a lack of standards to explicitly address the finer details of this kind of work (2017a; 2017b). **Uber drivers report that if they receive poor customer rankings they can be fired, despite some aspects of a journey having nothing to do with a driver's performance, such as heavy traffic, the loss of mobile data coverage, or passengers soiling the inside of the car. Drivers receive no help from the firm for related issues and often receive much less income than they were promised upon becoming drivers.** Drivers' working lives are so dominated by the platform, and the pay so low, that Nastiti described their condition as "sweated labour" (2017b). While much remains to be done, research suggests that offline platform work shares many of the disadvantages of its online counterpart.

Unions are not able to form and organize labor pressure against digital companies due to the lack of support from governmental protections. Workers are too afraid of losing their jobs to be able to engage in an act of protest.

Moore, '18 [Phoebe V. Moore is an Associate Professor in Political Economy and Technology at the University of Leicester's School of Business, Published: 2018, "the Threat of Physical and Psychosocial Violence and Harassment in Digitalized Work", International Labour Organization, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_617062.pdf] /Triumph Debate

The ILO Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work emphasize that no worker should be denied access to basic human rights, and that all countries that are ILO Members should uphold these principles, starting with freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. **Digitalized work has a range of characteristics that make it difficult for workers to organize in a traditional union context, as they are geographically widespread, are alone in taxis or on bikes and at home, and have limited communication with one another.** Digital workers often do not enjoy the status of an "employee", making it difficult to bargain and negotiate for basic rights — a lack of representation and social protection that puts them at risk of PPVH. However, **The first ever collective agreement for the platform economy has been signed in Denmark between Hilfr, a Danish platform for cleaning in private homes, and Fagligt, Faelles, Forbunng (3F) (United Federation of Danish Workers), the largest Danish trade union.'** **The collective agreement was signed by the founders of Hilfr and Tina Muller Madsen, group chairman for 3F cleaning and services in Copenhagen. The new collective agreement will enter into force in August 2018 and will guarantee sick pay, holiday allowance and a pension contribution for people who work on the Hilfr platform.** This ground-breaking agreement will run as a pilot agreement for the first 1 months, after which the parties have agreed to evaluate the agreement on the basis of gathered evidence. **There are several examples of union activities undertaken on behalf of digital workers, including campaigns and organizing, worker self-organizing and wildcat strikes. Even so, other than the Hilfr/3F pilot collective agreement, there are no other successful cases yet of collective bargaining in the digital workplace. There have been, however, cases of corporate attempts at trade union busting reported in digitalized workplaces** (Dahlborn, 2017). In October 2016, a strike of self-organized gig workers occurred in Italy where 50 Foodora workers demanded decent working conditions. **Two strike organizers were fired two days after the first protest for spurious reasons** (Tassinari and Maccarrone, 2017b), demonstrating the intense pressures of harassment which workers face, as well as their difficulties in organizing. **Workers have not been able to build a large-scale or effective digital labour movement. Perhaps because workers fear they are too easily replaceable in the global labour market of crowdwork and other digitalized work** (Graham et al, 2017, p. 155), **unions are currently working in the following ways to mitigate the worst impacts of PPVH in digitalized work.**

The digitalization of labor has moved the issue of labor precarity into academic spaces. The continual expansion of technology means that there are no jobs safe from attempted automation and exploitation.

Strauss, '20 [Kendra Strauss Professor and Director of the Labour Studies Program and The Morgan Centre for Labour Research at Simon Fraser University, Published: 12/23/2019, "Labour geography III: Precarity, racial capitalism and infrastructure", Progress in Human Geography, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132519895308>] /Triumph Debate

It is both notable and telling that there has been an upsurge of publications since 2016/17 that focus on experiences of precarity in academic labour in the neoliberal university. **Scholars have spotlighted structural gender inequalities and biases and the way precarious academic employment is gendered** (Bono et al., 2019; Ivancheva et al., 2019), **the implications of reproductive decisions and caring responsibilities on progression** (Maddrell et al., 2019) **in the context of assumed professional mobility** (Manzi et al., 2019), **and geography's disciplinary whiteness** (Faria et al., 2019), **all of which impact early career scholars, especially racialized women, disproportionately.** As Beverley Mullings and Sanjukta Mukherjee (2018: 1406) argue: **Combined with the rise of populist, Islamophobic and white supremacist movements across much of the global North, racialized and Indigenous scholars are finding themselves in universities that are increasingly hostile to claims for equality and inclusion... within the context of the shifting landscape of an academy that has become more competitive, less generous and increasingly precarious.** For geographers not based in Anglophone countries, and particularly for those outside Europe, competitive pressures of privatization, marketization, austerity and precarious employment in academia are heightened and compounded by the discipline's Anglophone biases in publishing and conferences, and Eurocentric and Anglo-centric genealogies of knowledge production and theory building which marginalize 'Other Geographical Traditions' (OGTs) (Ferretti, 2019). **That geographers are starting to write explicitly about precarity and academic labour also reflects a broader politics of labour on campuses, in which academics, students and communities struggle against precarious employment, work intensification, attacks on pensions and benefits, rising tuition fees, cuts to programs and ongoing austerity. Strikes and unionization drives have been combined with coalition building in ways that increasingly draw attention to academic labour as labour.** This body of work also highlights strategies and practices of resistance, solidarity, care and wellness (Mullings et al., 2016), which should not be lost on labour scholars interested in agency. In addition to discussions of mentoring and collaboration, Caitlin Henry (2018), for example, uses the work of Silvia Federici to reflect on the possibilities of building an alternative academy. **Reproductive work, she argues, is not confined to the sphere of the household: [it] includes the work that socially reproduces the institution of the academy itself... This latter work includes a range of tasks done by people of various degrees of security in the academy, but importantly, an increasing amount of foundational intellectual labor is done by workers who are structurally positioned as cheaper workers, reproducing the broader intellectual machine** (2018: 1367). Attention to precarity is, in this sense, one aspect of a called-for broadening of the approaches of labour and economic geographers to complex socio-spatial processes in which resistance and endurance, mobility and immobility, freedom and unfreedom are coexistent rather than contradictory. In some cases, this broadening involves reworking existing frameworks, as in Jordhus-Lier, Underthun, and Zampoukos' (2019) triad of labour control, labour agency and the territory-place-scale- network (TPSN) framework. The growth of work that develops Coe and Jordhus-Lier's (2011) concept of constrained agency (Chan, 2014; Schwiter et al., 2018b) reflects the precarity of agency itself. **This precarity of agency and resistance, as traditionally understood (reflected in, for example, workers' collective organizations), relates to, inter alia, the accelerated pace of technological change, including automation and the applications of artificial intelligence (AI) to an increasingly wide range of tasks; and to gig work, platform economies and digital intermediation** (Birtchnell and Elliott, 2018;

Bissell and Del Casino, 2017; Pierce et al., 2019; Richardson and Bissell, 2019). Louise Waite and Hannah Lewis (2017: 954), whose research with asylum-seekers in the UK has inspired so much geographical work on precarity, highlight the importance of contesting discourses of the new economy, such as the 'sharing economy', through the lens of the 'survival-oriented labouring' of hyper-precarious migrants. **In other words, even since 2016 there has been both a broadening and deepening of engagements with agency, its modalities and epistemologies, and diverse forms/places/ spaces of organizing in response to the ongoing restructuring of labour markets and the labour process, and the emergence of new sites and spaces of work** (Brown, 2018; Cowan, 2018; Gibson, 2019). Other sub-disciplines, like tourism geographies, are increasingly engaging with labour, changing norms and models of employment, and forms of precarity, thus opening up lines of communication with labour geography (see, for example, Canada, 2018; Chan, 2018; Ioannides and Zampoukos, 2018; Terry, 2018). Overlap with areas like labour law (Axelsson and Hedberg, 2018; Doucette and Kang, 2018; England and Alcorn, 2018; Strauss, 2015, 2016) and occupational health and safety (Prentice et al., 2018) is also growing, in part due to research agendas that highlight precaritization as a multi-modal process.

A/2 Specific Strike Bad

Without strikes, all jobs have started to demonstrate problematic scheduling, isolation from one another, or a variety of other harmful practices. Not allowing a group to have the right to strike harms that industry and results in workers performing worse.

Gourevitch, '18 [Alex Gourevitch is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, Published: 6/21/18, "The Right to Strike: A Radical View", American Political Science Association, doi:10.1017/S0003055418000321] /Triumph Debate

To explain why the right to strike is a right to resist oppression, I first must give an account of the relevant oppression. Oppression is the unjustifiable deprivation of freedom. Some deprivations or restrictions of freedom are justified and therefore do not count as oppression. The oppression that matters for this article is the class-based oppression of a typical liberal capitalist society. **By the class-based oppression, I mean the fact that the majority of able-bodied people find themselves forced to work for members of a relatively small group who dominate control over productive assets and who, thereby, enjoy unjustifiable control over the activities and products of those workers.** There are workers and then there are owners and their managers.

The facts I refer to here are mostly drawn from the United States to keep a consistent description of a specific society. While there is meaningful variation across liberal capitalist nations, the basic facts of class-based oppression do not change in a way that vitiates my argument's applicability to those countries too. Empirical analysis of each country to which the argument applies, and how it would apply, is a separate project. The first element of oppression in a class society resides in the fact that (a) there are some who are forced into the labor market while others are not and (b) those who are forced to work — workers — have to work for those who own productive resources. **Workers are forced into the labor market because they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job. They cannot produce necessary goods for themselves, nor can they rely on the charity of others, nor can they count on adequate state benefits.** The only way most people can gain reliable access to necessary goods is by buying them. The most reliable, often only, way most people have of acquiring enough money to buy those goods is through employment. That is the sense in which they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job working for an employer. Depending on how we measure income and wealth, about 60-80% of Americans are in this situation for most of their adult lives.⁹ **This forcing is not symmetrical. A significant minority is not similarly forced to work for someone else, though they might do so freely. That minority has enough wealth, either inherited or accumulated or both, that they have a reasonable alternative to entering the labor market.** So, this first dimension of oppression comes not from the fact that some are forced to work, but from the fact that the forcing is unequal and that asymmetry means some are forced to work for others. That is to say, what makes it oppressive is the wrong of unequally forcing the majority to work, for whatever purpose, while others face no such forcing at all." That way of organizing and distributing coercive work obligations, and of imposing certain kinds of forcing on workers, is an unjustifiable way of limiting their freedom and therefore oppressive. To fix ideas, I call this the structural element of oppression in class societies. **This structural element leads to a second, interpersonal dimension of oppression in the workplace itself Workers are forced to join workplaces typically characterized by large swathes of uncontrolled managerial power and authority.** This oppression is interpersonal in the sense that it is power that specific individuals- employers and their managers — have to get other specific individuals — employees — to do what they

want. We can distinguish between three overlapping forms that this interpersonal, workplace oppression takes: subordination, delegation, and dependence. Subordination: Employers have what are sometimes called "managerial prerogatives,"² which are legislative and judicial grants of authority to owners and their managers to make decisions about investment, hiring and firing, plant location, work process, and the like.³ These powers come from judicial precedent and from the constellation of corporate, labor, contract, and property law. **Managers may change working speeds and assigned tasks, the hours of work, or even force workers to spend up to an hour going through security lines after work without paying them** (Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk 2014). Managers may fire workers for Facebook comments, their sexual orientation, for being too sexually appealing, or for not being appealing enough (Emerson 2011; Hess 2013; Strauss 2013; Velasco 2011). **Workers may be given more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time, locked in the workplace overnight, required to work in extreme heat and other physically hazardous conditions, or punitively isolated from other coworkers** (Greenhouse 2009, 26—27, 49—55, 89, 111—112; Hsu 2011; JOMO 2013; Urbina 2013). Managers may pressure employees into unwanted political behavior (Hertel-Fernandez 2015). In all of these cases, managers are exercising legally permitted prerogatives.⁴ **The law does not require that workers have any formal say in how those powers are exercised. In fact, in nearly every liberal capitalist country, employees are defined, in law, as "subordinates."**⁵ This is subordination in the strict sense: workers are subject to the will of the employer. Delegation: There are also other discretionary legal powers that managers have not by legal statute or precedent but because workers have voluntarily delegated these powers in the contract. For instance, workers might sign a contract that allows managers to require employees to submit to random drug testing or unannounced searches (American Civil Liberties Union 2017). **In the United States, 18% of current employees and 37% of workers in their lifetime work under noncompete agreements** (Bunker 2016). These clauses give managers legal power to forbid workers from working for competitors. The contract that the Communications Workers of America had with Verizon until 2015 included a right for managers to force employees to perform from 10 to 15 hours of overtime per week and to take some other day instead of Saturday as an off-day (Gourevitch 2016a). **These legal powers are not parts of the managerial prerogatives that all employers have. Rather, they are voluntarily delegated to employers by workers. In many cases, though the delegation is in one sense voluntary, in another sense it is forced. This will especially be the case if workers, who are forced to find jobs, can only find jobs in sectors where the only contracts available are ones that require these kinds of delegations.** • Dependence: Finally, managers might have the material power to force employees to submit to commands or even to accept violations of their rights because of the worker's dependence on the employer. A headline example is wage-theft, which affects American workers to the tune of \$8- \$14 billion per year (Eisenbray 2015; Judson and Francisco-McGuire 2012; NELP 2013; Axt 2013). **In other cases, workers have been forced to wear diapers rather than go to the bathroom, refused legally required lunch breaks, or pressured to work through them, forced to keep working after their shift is up, or denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning during break** (Oxfam 2015; Bennett- Smith 2012; Egelko 2011; Greenhouse 2009, 3- 12; Little 2013; Vega 2012). Other employers have forced their workers to stay home rather than go out on weekends or to switch churches and alter religious practices on pain of being fired and deported (Garrison, Bensinger, and Singer-Vine 2015). **In these cases, employers are not exercising legal prerogatives, they are instead taking advantage of the material power that comes with threatening to fire or otherwise discipline workers. This material power to get workers to do things that employers want is in part a function of the class structure of society, both in the wide sense of workers being asymmetrically dependent on owners, and in the narrower sense of workers being legally subordinate to employers. Subordination, delegation, and dependence add up to a form of interpersonal oppression that employers and their managers have over their employees. The weight and scope of this oppression will vary, but those are variations on a theme.** Employers and managers enjoy wide swaths of uncontrolled or insufficiently controlled power over their employees. This is the second face of oppression in a class society and it is a live issue. **For instance, during the Verizon strike of 2016, one major complaint was that, when out on the job, hanging cable, or repairing lines, some technicians had to ask their manager for permission to go to the bathroom or to get a drink of water.** As one striker said in an

interview, "Do I have to tell my boss every single minute of what I am doing? This is basic human dignity" (Gourevitch 2016b). If they did not ask or wait to get clear approval from their manager, then they were guilty of a time code violation and were suspended for up to six weeks. The strike made workplace control a direct issue and one measure of its success was a change in disciplinary proceedings (ibid.). To take another example, the Fight for \$15 strikes have made control over scheduling a central demand, even managing in certain states and municipalities to pass laws mandating minimal regularity and predictability in weekly schedules (Andrias 2016, 47 —70).

Medical strikes should be allowed, as they are able to fight underfunding and neglect that have systemically undermined the medical system.

Essex & Weldon, '21 [Ryan Essex is a research fellow with the Institute for Lifecourse Development at the University of Greenwich, Sharon M. Weldon is a professor in healthcare simulation and workforce development at the University of Greenwich, Published: 6/17/21, "Health Care Worker Strikes and the Covid Pandemic", The New England Journal of Medicine, <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2103327>] /Triumph Debate

Experts in law, ethics, and medicine have long debated whether and when strike action by health care personnel can be justified. Although these debates have centered on the risks that strikes carry for patients, these actions also pose risks for health care workers — they may damage morale and team cohesion, for example, and in many countries strikes have been repressed violently. Other risks relate to public perceptions and to potentially broader harms for both society and the health care community as a whole.³ Perhaps most fundamentally, however, strikes raise questions about what health care workers owe society and what society owes them. **Past debates, however, have perhaps not had to consider such unprecedented circumstances: Should doctors in Myanmar, for example, have to continue to work under a military government during a pandemic? Although we can't readily answer this question, there are some key considerations in assessing strikes during Covid-19.** Perhaps the most obvious is that the pandemic has raised the stakes for such actions. On the one hand, it could be argued that health care workers are needed more than ever; on the other, it could also be argued that they should not be expected to work with inadequate PPE and other protections in place. **Beyond these dilemmas, Covid-19 has not only highlighted our collective vulnerability, but also revealed the impact of decades of underfunding and neglect as well as a more recent disdain for science. In many ways, debates about the risks associated with strike action have led to a stalemate, as these dilemmas are only present because of deeper structural problems.** In an article published about 6 months before the first cases of Covid-19 were reported, entitled "Invest in public health now, or store up problems for the future," Finch argues that the ongoing underfunding of public health in England was likely to have future implications, increasing the need for services and raising costs in the longer term.⁴ **Underfunding was one of many problems faced by health care in the United Kingdom before the pandemic, with decades of austerity believed to have contributed to tens of thousands of preventable deaths.**⁵ Covid-19 has led to some of the most profound changes to social life in living memory. It has also shed light on many challenges that might otherwise have been brushed aside: underfunding, neglect, and indifference to health and health care. It has left us with two related issues: What should be done to avert strike action? And more important, how can we address broader structural failings? How we get to the root cause of these problems will vary from country to country, as will who should be accountable for them and what can be done to solve these problems. Contrasts can be drawn here among well-resourced countries, but even starker differences exist globally, especially given the likely future impact of Covid-19 in low- and middle-income countries. Yet **some immediate steps could be taken everywhere in response to warnings about long-term effects on the mental health of health care workers: support should be provided, now and into the future. Though it is tempting to say that we also need to pay health care workers more and improve their working conditions, and we do, such actions will have little long-term impact if health care systems remain neglected. It would be nice to say that it shouldn't take a pandemic or a strike to force countries to confront these issues, but the past 12 months justify a certain skepticism.** Even as Covid-19 continues to affect millions of people, we can only hope it prompts a reassessment not only of how health care workers are treated, but also of the value we place on health and health care.

Nurse and doctor strikes do not exist in a vacuum. Each member of the community must work with others in order to provide quality care.

Neiman, '11 [Paul Neiman is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at St Cloud State University, Published: 2011, "Nursing strikes: An ethical perspective on the US healthcare community", Nursing Ethics, doi: 10.1177/09697330] /Triumph Debate

In these two simplified examples, it is natural to focus the moral blame on individuals — nurses or administrators — whose action seems to diminish the quality of care. However, the decision to strike or increase staffing ratios does not occur in a vacuum. Healthcare institutions exist within a larger healthcare community in which many others influence the quality of care patients receive. In the United States, insurance companies may decide not to cover procedures or medications that doctors believe are needed, resulting in decreased quality of patient care. **State and federal politicians, perhaps at the urging of taxpayers, may cut programs that provide revenue to hospitals that cover the cost of providing care to low income or uninsured patients. When public programs for the uninsured are cut, the cost of providing care is passed from taxpayers to hospitals. In turn, hospitals may pass the costs on to insurance companies, patients, or their employees. All of these groups — healthcare institutions, healthcare workers, taxpayers, patients, politicians and insurance companies — are interdependent.** Together, they form the healthcare community that fulfills the responsibility of the community as a whole to provide healthcare for its members. Clearly the members of the healthcare community sometimes work at cross-purposes, but collectively, their decisions determine the quality and availability of healthcare in the United States. Through these decisions, they fulfill the responsibility of the community as a whole to provide healthcare for its members. **But there is no mechanism for assigning precise responsibilities to particular members of the healthcare community. Rather, each member of the healthcare community avoids responsibility for providing health- care by putting pressure on other members of the healthcare community, or assumes responsibility by succumbing to the pressure of others.** Consider, for example, an insurance company's decision to deal with the rising cost of healthcare by denying coverage more frequently. This puts pressure on hospitals to provide more charity care, which in turn creates pressure to increase staffing ratios and decrease wages and benefits. Hospitals may decide to raise rates, and this puts pressure on taxpayers by pushing more people to seek assistance from state and federal programs. **As members of the healthcare community compete with one another over how healthcare is provided, the availability and quality of care may fluctuate.**

The right to strike is critical to the building of a strong middle class, especially for public employees in negotiations with the state.

Myall, '19 [James Myall is a writer and researcher for the Maine Center for Economic Policy, Published: 4/17/19, "Right to strike would level the playing field for public workers with benefits for all of us", Maine Center for Economic Policy, <https://www.mecep.org/blog/right-to-strike-would-level-the-playing-field-for-public-workers-with-benefits-for-all-of-us/>] /Triumph Debate

Unions support a fairer economy. Periods of high union membership are associated with lower levels of income inequality, both nationally and in Maine. **Strong unions, including public-sector unions, have a critical role to play in rebuilding a strong middle class. Unions help combat inequities within work places. Women and people of color in unions face less wage discrimination than those in nonunion workplaces.** On average, wages for nonunionized white women in Maine are 18 percent less than of those of white men. Among unionized workers, that inequality shrinks to just 9 percent. Similarly, women of color earn 26 percent less than men in nonunionized jobs; for unionized women of color, the wage gap shrinks to 17 percent.^[i] All of us have a stake in the success of collective bargaining. But a union without the right to strike loses much of its negotiating power. The right to withdraw your labor is the foundation of collective worker action. **When state employees or teachers are sitting across the negotiating table from their employers, how much leverage do they really have when they can be made to work without a contract? It's like negotiating the price of a car when the salesman knows you're going to have to buy it — whatever the final price is.** Research confirms that public-sector unions are less effective without the right to strike. **Public employees with a right to strike earn between 2 percent and 5 percent more than those without it.**^[ii] While that's a meaningful increase for those workers, **it also should assuage any fears that a right to strike would lead to excessive pay increases or employees abusing their new right.**

Strong unions can get concessions even without going on strike, as the threat of a strike is enough to get compliance with quality of life improvements for workers. This means that there is little risk of widespread issues within industries.

Oka, '16 [Chikako Oka is a lecturer at the School of Management, Royal Holloway University of London, Published: September 2016, "Improving Working conditions in Garment Supply Chains: The Role of Unions in Cambodia", British Journal of Industrial Relations, doi: 10.1111/bjir.12118] /Triumph Debate

In Cambodia's exporting garment sector, the growth of unions has intensified competition among unions trying to attract members and led to aggressive tactics notably strikes, according to the labour officer of the employers' association, GMAC. When a problem arises, workers go from one union to another, looking for the most helpful union to solve their problem. Trying not to lose 'face' and members, unions fight hard against management even if the workers' demand is unreasonable. While the multiplicity of unions may have empowered workers as they can pick and choose the union that represents their interest, it has intensified union rivalry and increased strikes. **The rise of unions, widespread strikes and important penalty imposed by buyers for late delivery appear to have prompted some factory managers to improve compliance.** Empty shelves in shops caused by late shipment are buyers' nightmare, explains an industry consultant. Moreover, in the trend-sensitive fashion industry, shipments arriving late in the season are of little value. **Consequently, if factories fail to deliver on-time, almost all buyers require garments to be transported by air freight instead of ship, wiping out all the profits of garment factories.** In addition, serious delays are further punished by discount. **This is why striking workers almost always obtain their pay during the strike action as part of the condition to go back to work. 'Employers are desperate to get workers back to work. This is "on-time industry"', notes the labour officer of GMAC. Nearly 70 per cent of managers interviewed cited avoiding problems with unions and pre-empting strikes as one of the main motivations to improve compliance.** The manager of a large Hong Kong-owned factory says: 'GMAC sends many strike reports about what went on in other factories. I take preventative measures and comply 100 per cent with the labour law to avoid problems'. The manager of another Hong-Kong owned factory concurs saying 'workers know about the labour code'. This factory experienced a major dispute in 2007, which turned into a high profile case involving a global union federation and global buyers such as Inditex and H&M. Increasingly, however, workers' demands centre on conditions that exceed legal compliance, notably leave and pecuniary conditions. **Employers preoccupied with pre-empting disputes offer conditions that exceed legal requirements in order to avoid problems with unions.** A large Singaporean-owned factory provides extra holidays around the Khmer New Year, in addition to respecting the legal requirement of paid annual leave and paid sick leave. Moreover, in response to worker demands, the \$6 cost of living allowance has been added to the base wage, which is used to calculate overtime and various bonuses. Similarly, a large Malaysian-owned factory implements the 'best practice'. **To get workers to cooperate, the management gives the minimum wage straight to probationary workers, provides extra food allowance for overtime, and offers attendance bonus of US\$5 despite some unauthorized absence, all of which exceed the legal requirements.**

Nurses need the same capacity to put pressure on other members of the health care community to increase support. They are the only group that does so to increase the quality of care in the long run.

Neiman, '11 [Paul Neiman is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at St Cloud State University, Published: 2011, "Nursing strikes: An ethical perspective on the US healthcare community", Nursing Ethics, doi: 10.1177/09697330] /Triumph Debate

The ethical dilemma raised by nurses' strikes can be resolved by examining nurses' role in the system of competing interest that characterizes the healthcare community in the United States. The argument for the morality of nurses' strikes is thus tied to the nature of the healthcare community as an institution that fulfills the obligation of the community as a whole to provide healthcare for its members. Trappenburg suggests that Walzer's philosophy in Spheres of justice can be applied to the medical sphere. She states, 'Our shared understandings are presumed to have been reflected in the way we have built institutions, in concrete societal arrangements, and they can be squeezed out of those arrangements when we need them to solve even harder cases.' **It seems that the ethical dilemma raised by nurses' strikes can be 'squeezed out' of an examination of the role nurses play in the system of competing interests that characterize the healthcare community in the United States. Each member of the healthcare community — insurance companies, hospitals, taxpayers, and so forth — has the ability to put pressure on other members by decreasing its contribution to the community's effort to meet its healthcare obligations. The ability of members of the healthcare community to do this is part of the system of competing interests used by the community as a whole to fulfill its responsibility to provide healthcare.** If, from the viewpoint of the community's responsibility for healthcare, insurance companies are justified in making a choice, independent of the impact on patient care, to raise premiums, or hospitals are justified in making a choice, independent of the impact on patient care, to increase nurse-to-staff ratios, then nurses must also be justified in going on strike to protect their own interests or to advocate for the future of nursing, regardless of the impact on patient care. **If the system of competing interests that characterizes the healthcare community in the United States is morally justifiable, then there seems to be no compelling reason why insurance companies, hospital administrators, and taxpayers should be justified in competing over their interests, but nurses should not.** Now, there are several reasons why nurses might be excluded from the system of competing interests through which the community fulfills its healthcare obligations. The most intuitive reason is that when nurses go on strike, patient care suffers. **But the quality of healthcare also suffers when insurance companies deny coverage, hospital administrators increase staffing ratios, or governments cut funding to programs serving the poor and uninsured. Excluding nurses on the basis of harm to patients is thus not consistent with the nature of the healthcare community, in which each group competes over how healthcare is to be provided, including by taking actions that may be detrimental to the quality of care provided to the community. Of the members of the healthcare community discussed in this article, only nurses actually deliver care.** It may seem that nurses are not justified in ceasing to deliver care, since other members of the healthcare community, such as hospital administrators, are not in a position to replace them by taking a shift on the floor. By contrast, if insurance companies deny coverage to patients, hospitals may increase the amount of charity care they provide, or government may step in to increase public insurance programs. But the impact of nurses withdrawing care by going on strike is a direct decrease in the quality of care patients receive. **But whether the impact on patients is direct, as in the case of going on strike, or indirect, as in the case of increasing nurse- to-patient ratios, the result is the same: the quality of patient care declines.** **Given that the community's responsibility for healthcare is fulfilled**

through a system of competing interests in which each member of the healthcare community is permitted to act in ways that put pressure on the others, and these acts can negatively impact patient care, the fact that nurses deliver care, while other members of the community set the conditions under which care is delivered, does not seem to justify excluding nurses from this process. Moreover, given the nature of the healthcare community, it seems immoral not to permit nurses to participate by going on strike as a means of putting pressure on other members of the healthcare community to increase their share of the responsibility for healthcare.

Consider, for example, the decision confronting Twin Cities' nurses during the recent labor dispute. They were faced with the choice between the safety of their current patients, which would be threatened if they went on strike over staffing ratios, and the safety of their future patients, which would be threatened if they did not go on strike over staffing ratios. As a member of the healthcare community, nurses ought to be entitled to make this choice, just as hospital administrators are entitled to make choices about staffing ratios, and insurance company executives are entitled to make choices about coverage. **But where**

other members of the healthcare community may have their own self-interest in mind when making this choice, in this case nurses seem to have the interests of their patients in mind. There seems to be no grounds for denying nurses the right to make this choice, when the nature of the healthcare community, in its function of fulfilling the community's responsibility to provide healthcare, entitles others to make similar choices. Denying nurses the right to make such a decision leaves them in the unenviable position of being the only member of the healthcare community that cannot put pressure on other members to increase their share of the responsibility to provide healthcare. **This would treat nurses, one of the most important parts of the healthcare community, as less than a full member of the healthcare community.**

Negative Cards

Right to Work

Right to work legislation, which would be reversed by the right to strike, accelerates economic growth, increases business investment, raises wages, and reduces labor costs.

Eisenach, '18 [Jeffrey Eisenach is a Managing Director and Co-Chair of NERA's Communications, Media, and Internet Practice. He is also an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University Law School, where he teaches Regulated Industries, and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Published: May 2018, "Right-To-Work Laws: The Economic Evidence" NERA Economic Consulting, https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2018/PUB_Right_to_Work_Laws_0518_web.pdf] /Triumph Debate

Much of the debate over RTW laws has focused on their potential economic impact. Journalists have noted, for example, that Indiana and Michigan (which passed RTW laws in 2012) have experienced accelerated economic growth since the laws were passed. As the Wall Street Journal reported, in the wake of the enactment of Indiana's RTW law in early 2012, "from March 2012 to November 2014 factory payroll employment grew 9.4% compared to 1.2% average growth for states without right-to-work laws."¹⁰ **Similarly, "[f]rom March 2013 when [Michigan's] law took effect through November 2014, the state saw 4% payroll manufacturing job growth, beating an average of 2.8% in right-to-work states and 0.9% in non-right-to-work states."**¹¹ More recently, a 2017 study found that the unemployment rates in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin had fallen by between 0.5 and 2.2 percent following the passage of RTW legislation, with Michigan's unemployment rate falling by 4.8 percent after passage.¹² **Proponents of RTW laws similarly cited economic performance as rationale for passing RTW legislation in Kentucky and Missouri.**¹³ While the economic results in these states do not by themselves demonstrate causality, they are broadly consistent with a substantial body of economic literature suggesting that, on balance, RTW laws lead to higher levels of economic performance. The first section below presents a review of the existing evidence. **First, the empirical literature suggests that RTW laws affect the location decisions of businesses and employees alike, with manufacturers choosing to locate in RTW states and workers migrating to these states.** It is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of these results, that there is a positive relationship between RTW laws and better economic performance. **Second, the empirical literature has also studied the effect of RTW laws on wages. Opponents have argued that – whatever their effects on economic growth – RTW laws could result in lower wages and thus harm workers. As explained below, despite the evidence that RTW laws lead to lower union density, the empirical literature on their effects on wages is inconclusive, and some studies indicate that wages are significantly higher in RTW than in non-RTW states.** **Third, there is a broad consensus in the academic literature that RTW laws are associated with lower union density; numerous studies show that higher union density is associated with higher labor costs to businesses and reduced economic performance.**

Right to work states had more than 10 percentage points greater job growth than non-RTW states, which would've created almost a quarter million jobs.

Eisenach, '18 [Jeffrey Eisenach is a Managing Director and Co-Chair of NERA's Communications, Media, and Internet Practice. He is also an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University Law School, where he teaches Regulated Industries, and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Published: May 2018, "Right-To-Work Laws: The Economic Evidence" NERA Economic Consulting, https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2018/PUB_Right_to_Work_Laws_0518_web.pdf] /Triumph Debate

It has been widely noted that employment growth in RTW states has exceeded employment growth in non-RTW states by a wide margin, an observation which is broadly supported by the empirical studies summarized above and is confirmed by recent performance. As shown in Figure 2, **private sector employment grew by 27 percent in RTW states between 2001 and 2016, over ten percentage points more than non-RTW states.** The academic literature also notes that **the effects of RTW laws are most significant in heavily unionized industries such as manufacturing and construction.** Figures 3 and 4 compare changes in employment in these industries in RTW and non-RTW states from 2001 through 2016. Figure 3 shows that manufacturing employment has declined in the U.S. during this period in both RTW and non-RTW states. However, the decline has been smaller in RTW states. As shown in Figure 3, manufacturing employment declined by less than 20 percent in RTW states compared with 25 percent in non-RTW states from 2001 to 2016. Figure 4 shows that **construction jobs grew by approximately six percent in RTW states, while non-RTW states grew by only 0.2 percent during the same period. The data also show that RTW states have experienced lower unemployment than non-RTW states.** As shown in Figure 5, RTW states have had lower average annual unemployment in every year from 2001 to 2017. **On average, the annual unemployment rate in RTW states was 0.4 percentage points lower than in non-RTW states. In concrete terms, if non-RTW states had had the same unemployment rate as RTW states in 2017, approximately 249,000 more people would have been employed.** Again, these observations are in line with the academic literature.

The UFF union failed to work effectively due to an overly large focus on enforcing worker contracts as opposed to other components of union work. This has been replicated throughout the United States, weakening unions nationally.

Nissen & Churchill, '20 [Bruce Nissen is a professor emeritus of labor studies and director of research at the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida International University, Candi Churchill is the Executive Director of the United Faculty of Florida, Published: 3/18/20, "Unionism in a Right-to-Work Environment: United Faculty of Florida from Stagnation to Crisis Mobilization to Power Building" Labor Studies Journal, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0160449X20911710?casa_token=11A79b9iHaoAAAA%3AFnJtmJ2ZU1binb-15TKnRW8vHzYkNvxvMqSI1MFLxuL-HI6JOhy-3lYyoMChkH8hJpDu08ZNRslj] /Triumph Debate

Both Table 1 and Chart 1 show that from 1978 to 1998 and through to 2001, the union declined in relative size and power; density dropped from 31 percent in 1978 to 20.4 percent in 1998 and 18.4 percent in 2001. After that density grew either incrementally or explosively to its current high point above 40 percent. What explains the differences? Part of the answer lies in changes in the focus and operation of the union. **During its first two decades, the union was strongly and narrowly focused on bargaining a collective bargaining agreement and enforcing that agreement. Other aspects of union power such as political activism/influence or internal organizing and recruitment were not a priority. This was especially true for internal organizing and recruitment of new members but was also true to a lesser extent in the political arena.** When one of us (Bruce Nissen) moved to Florida and joined one of the chapters in 1997, he seldom heard any mention of membership activation or recruitment, either at the chapter level or at the twice-a-year statewide UFF statewide Senate meeting. Occasional political topics were brought up but only in the form of asking chapters to generate a few calls to local legislators to counter some particularly bad legislation. **A few chapters had functioning political action committees or a newsletter, but the vast majority did not. And virtually no chapter had an active membership and recruitment committee. A union has three main sources of power: bargaining and enforcing a contract, political (and community) influence, and membership organizing and growth. The UFF during this period was narrowly and lopsidedly focused on only the first. This brand of unionism, variously known as "the service model," "business unionism," "contracts R us," "insurance policy unionism," and other such names, encourages a strictly transactional relationship between bargaining unit members and the union.** Viewing the union as akin to an insurance agency or a law firm, bargaining unit members ask, "What have you done for me lately?" The union is not viewed as "We faculty collectively addressing and solving our problems" and instead is seen as an external servicing agency. **This creates very little loyalty to the organization and encourages a good segment of the faculty to opt to become "free riders" who obtain the benefits of the union's presence without joining and paying union dues.**³ With so little emphasis on membership recruitment or member ownership and involvement, it is not hard to understand the many years of stagnation and slow decline in union density. Figure 1 illustrates the lopsided emphasis on contract negotiation and enforcement compared to the other aspects of a healthy well-functioning union. **Giving very little attention to membership growth and participation** (the base of Figure 1), **the union had been concentrating primarily on the right-hand line of the "union triangle," making for an unbalanced union that was not optimally effective.**

Right to work conditions force unions to work on building up organizational capacity and serving all workers to the best of their ability.

Nissen & Churchill, '20 [Bruce Nissen is a professor emeritus of labor studies and director of research at the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida International University, Candi Churchill is the Executive Director of the United Faculty of Florida, Published: 3/18/20, "Unionism in a Right-to-Work Environment: United Faculty of Florida from Stagnation to Crisis Mobilization to Power Building" Labor Studies Journal, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0160449X20911710?casa_token=11A79b9iHaoAAAA%3AFnJtmJ2ZU1binb-15TKnRW8vHzYkNvxvMqSI1MFLxuL-HI6JOhy-3lYyoMChkH8hJpDu08ZNRsLj] /Triumph Debate

The evolution of the UFF should hold lessons for public-sector unions operating under open shop right-to-work conditions in the post-Janus era. Here, we analyze the UFF experience to determine what factors make for a more effective and powerful union under these

circumstances. The first lesson to draw is that a virtually singular focus on collective bargaining and contract enforcement essentially behind closed doors in times of stability will lead to stagnation and decline in membership and internal vitality. **The union must constantly focus on organization-building. This includes constant organizational focus on recruitment, member activation, and leadership development. While this lesson may seem obvious, it is frequently breached in practice.** As co-author Candi Churchill has coined, "in UFF, we are putting the collective back in collective bargaining" and attempting to build a culture that is participatory and inviting. Easier said than done, but UFF is heading this direction and more people are joining and stepping up as a result. **A second lesson is that times of crisis that include threats to the union's future can be a tremendous opportunity to shake a union out of lethargy if there are individuals within the primary and secondary leadership levels and/or within the staff who recognize the opportunity and take advantage of it to create major internal change. This is a variant of the old adage, "Never let a good crisis go**

to waste." A similar point is made by labor historians Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello in their book chapter, "American Labor: The Promise of Decline" (Brecher and Costello 2018). In the case of the UFF, the crisis points of 2000-2003 and 2010-2011 were decisive turning points that turned the union into a more powerful organization. Legal and technical strategies in times of crises will fail if not in concert with a vigorous one-on-one organizing campaign. You might win the lawsuits but have no real power or organization if the singular focus is in the hands of a drawn-out legal system (no matter how skilled the attorney and righteous the cause, the lesson is that a union must organize to be successful). **A third lesson is that the union's internal culture (meaning its central preoccupations and ways of conducting itself) is critical but is usually ignored as a subject of self-analysis. The union's earlier lopsided focus on "insurance policy unionism," its almost totally reactive way of conducting business, and its failure to strategically focus on building a power organization were big obstacles to building an effective organization, just as its later reversal of all these characteristics improved the organization.**

These are factors that can be critically assessed and acted upon if leadership and staff are aware of them and choose to systematically and routinely do so. **A fourth lesson is that national affiliate support for local union revitalization can be a crucial addition, especially if it is aimed at clear organizational results and is contingent on local member activism to carry out the needed work.** In this case, national union support to provide staff to help the membership recertify all ten university chapters in 2001 (2002-2006) and later to fund programs like the 2018 UFF Organizing Fellows Program played a crucial role in building the union. In addition, NEA Higher Education Organizer Valerie Wilk has been a supplemental field staffer and knows the hallways and offices on many Florida campuses. AFT and NEA field organizers who work with local leaders even a few weeks a year go a long way in supporting local leaders and building their skills and confidence. National staff that come in and supplant the work of leaders without buy-in and participation is just not effective in the long term, as was the case at one campus where dozens of temp staffers were flown in and quickly got over one hundred memberships. Within a semester, those new members dropped their membership as the crisis abated and they had no relationship to the person who signed them up. When a colleague recruits a member, few ever resign once they make the decision to join in a

right-to-work environment. Paying members to recruit is a new experiment in UFF to build a cadre of lead organizers around the state, but the growth outlined in this paper has come from member volunteers with very little staff or funding. Organizing Fellows should not supplant the need to find and develop leaders in the buildings who take ownership in their union any more than staff should supplant that much needed broad ownership and buy-in. **A fifth lesson is that building internal capacity within the membership and leadership pays off over the long run. The post-2011 training that the union repeatedly engages in is bearing fruit as shown by the substantial growth in membership and union density and internal union functioning. Training should not be overlooked or ignored, but many unions give it only lip service or confine training to a very small number of top leaders or supporters of the leadership.** Trainings should not be “sit and get” lectures either. They must be practical in that practice and skills are emphasized and action based, with members sharing successes and concrete tools for other members to utilize and build upon. UFF has developed an organizing booklet and makes it available for other unions to use and repurpose called “Building a Powerful Grassroots Union.” The Labor Notes website and book *Secrets of a Successful Organizer* has proven very helpful to UFF staff and membership teams with free handouts and tested workshop activities that engage members and inspire change.⁴ **A sixth lesson is that the orientation of a union’s staff and leadership makes a decisive difference. Vision, experience with issue organizing and strategic focus should not be underestimated compared to technical skills. In the UFF’s case, the transition to a new strategically focused Executive Director with decades of a proven track record building unions and the hiring of talented and committed field staff have strengthened the union’s organizational capacity many-fold.** The union now grows and gains proficiency even absent a crisis, a far cry from previous periods of stability that resulted in stagnation and decline. Elected leadership also matters: in 2001, the union elected a statewide president who supported an emphasis on recruitment and growth, a decided change from his predecessor. All statewide UFF presidents since have supported the new emphasis on organizational growth and often travel to the campuses to assist chapter leaders. UFF’s focus has shifted from the bargaining table in Tallahassee to the members in the labs, libraries, and classrooms. While unions cannot “pick” elected leaderships the way they can staff, both the staff and conscious members can and should be looking to develop and nurture future leaders at all levels who exhibit strategic vision and leadership potential. Staff and leaders are needed to help build and inspire teams to accomplish their goals, not write contract language or answer grievance inquiries full-time.

Weakening union power and require them to work together through right to work legislation results in higher life satisfaction overall.

Millsap, 18 [Adam Millsap is the Senior Fellow for economic opportunity issues at Stand Together and the Charles Koch Institute, Published: 10/23/19, “Right-To-Work Laws Are Good For Workers” Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2019/10/23/right-to-work-laws-are-good-for-workers/?sh=7710d1c23119>] /Triumph Debate

There’s evidence that wealth inequality is increasing, and some politicians are using this evidence as a justification for revitalizing labor unions. Many Democratic presidential candidates support the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act, which would ban state right-to-work laws that currently prevent unions and employers from mandating union membership as a condition of employment. But new evidence shows that the PRO Act is misguided—right-to-work laws increase worker satisfaction, especially among union workers.

In an upcoming study in the Journal of Law and Economics, economist Christos Makridis finds that workers report greater life satisfaction after their state becomes a right-to-work state. The study uses data on self-reported life satisfaction from daily Gallup polls and state economic data to identify how worker satisfaction responded to the enactment of state right-to-work laws between 2008 and 2017. Over this period, **six states adopted right-to-work laws: Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky.** As shown in the map below, a total of 27 states currently have right-to-work laws. **The study finds the enactment of a right-to-work law increased self-reported current life satisfaction, expected future life satisfaction, and sentiments about current and future economic activity among workers.**

Moreover, the effects were especially large among union workers. For example, the increase in economic sentiment caused by a right-to-work law was nearly half the size of the increase in economic sentiment due to having a college degree. According to the author, this suggests “...that the passage of right-to-work laws fundamentally raises the optimism that union workers have about their economic prospects.” The study explores several possible explanations for why right-to-work laws increase workers’ life satisfaction. One is the potential income effect of “free-riding”. **When workers don’t have to pay dues to be union members in right-to-work states, they can use the extra money to buy other things without impacting their union status.** However, this doesn’t seem to be the mechanism as there’s no evidence that workers increase consumption enough to drive the increase in reported life satisfaction. Additionally, the idea of widespread free-riding is dubious since labor unions don’t benefit all union members equally. **Younger, healthier, and less experienced workers are often harmed by union agreements that use experience as a basis for promotion or emphasize health and retirement benefits at the cost of higher wages.**

The recent United Auto Workers agreement with General Motors (GM), for example, kept employees’ share of health care costs at 3% as opposed to the 15% GM suggested. While this may be a win for older workers or those with children who consume a lot of health care, younger, childless workers may have preferred higher wages in exchange for high-deductible insurance plans with higher co-pays. Another mechanism potentially driving the increase in worker life satisfaction is that there are different people in unions before and after the adoption of right-to-work laws. **If the people who didn’t like the union to begin with—and thus have low life satisfaction—are the ones who opt out after the law changes, then the higher reported life satisfaction of those who remain in the union could drive the overall effect.**

The author finds some evidence of this, but it’s not enough to explain the bulk of the effect. **The channels that seem to best explain the increase in worker satisfaction are that right-to-work laws improve employer-employee relationships and encourage unions to better serve their members.** The study finds that the adoption of a right-to-work law is associated with an increase in the probability that a worker reports that their boss treats them like a partner and creates an open and trusting work environment. **Together, more attention from union leadership and workplace improvements can help explain why workers report greater satisfaction as a result of right-to-work laws.**

So, if right-to-work laws make workers better off, why do so many Democratic politicians oppose

them? Perhaps because right-to-work laws harm their political prospects. A study by James Feigenbaum, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Vanessa Williamson finds that right-to-work laws reduce Democratic presidential vote shares and political contributions from organized labor, while also moving state policy in a more conservative direction. Thus, politicians' self-interest rather than a benevolent concern for workers is likely a reason behind the support of the PRO Act that would ban state right-to-work laws. Regardless of what one thinks about the importance of labor unions, the reality is unions don't work well in a service economy. Unions standardize wages, work hours, and working conditions for the occupations they cover, and this only makes sense if the workers in those occupations have the same productivity and preferences. In many factory jobs productivity is limited by the speed of the assembly line—the faster the line, the more work everyone does. Additionally, workers can only work if everyone is in place and the line is moving. These features of assembly line production ensure that workers are equally productive. This isn't the case in many service-sector jobs. Some people can cut hair, cook meals, or clean houses or hotel rooms faster than others without sacrificing quality. Others may take more time but are exceptionally good. Similar variation exists among teachers, doctors, and lawyers. Standardizing wages and work hours doesn't make sense when there are significant speed or quality differences among workers. Since most workers today are in the service-sector, it's not surprising that labor unions are declining in importance.

While the decline of labor unions may worry some, the evidence shows that right-to-work laws that give workers the freedom to opt out of unions increase worker satisfaction.

Politicians that want to help unions by eliminating such laws are fighting against economic fundamentals and aren't doing workers any favors.

With labor markets changing over the past 4 decades, right to work legislation serves as a new vehicle for increasing union productivity and service for workers.

Makridis, '20 [Christos Andreas Makridis serves as a (Research) Assistant Professor at Arizona State University, a Digital Fellow at the MIT Sloan Initiative on the Digital Economy, a non-resident fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government Cyber Security Initiative, a non-resident fellow at the Baylor University Institute for Studies of Religion, and a senior adviser to Gallup, Published: November 2019, "Do Right-to-Work Laws Work? Evidence on Individuals' Well-Being and Economic Sentiment " Journal of Law and Economics, [**There has been a fundamental transformation in the way employees and employers contract with one another in the labor market over the past 4 decades as performance-related pay has become increasingly common** \(Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 2009\) and union density has declined \(Hirsch 2012\).](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/707081?casa_token=gkEI70GnO5EAAAAA:AunBbzKt8I3_KDOuJ-HNIBONw8oUxrJ2aSWqgKGR-G2_StE1Ffqbnlw7c-WdhRZUu16xOKqTk2U] /Triumph Debate</p></div><div data-bbox=)

Although there is unambiguous evidence that these moves toward stronger incentives are associated with improvements in productivity (Paarsch and Shearer 1999, 2000; Lazear 2000; Shearer 2004; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2005) and human capital formation (Shaw and Lazear 2008; Makridis 2019) among employees and greater flexibility among firms (Makridis and Gittleman 2018), **it remains an open question whether these changes have also positively affected the**

well-being of workers or if the gains in productivity have simply gone toward firms. The answer will play a major role in determining the optimal policy response to increasing automation and technological adoption among firms in the emerging gig economy. This paper provides the first evidence, to my knowledge, that the adoption of RTW laws has increased individual well-being and economic optimism, even after controlling for a wide array of time-varying state and individual factors and time-invariant differences across location and time.

Using microdata collected by Gallup's US daily poll between 2008 and 2017, I show that the adoption of RTW laws increases current and future expected life satisfaction and economic optimism. Using a DD estimator and entropy reweighting, **I find that these gains are concentrated among union workers, which suggests that those who have benefited most are precisely those whom the legislation targeted.** The results are robust to controlling for a wide array of time-varying state characteristics, including contemporaneous and lagged employment growth, to testing for the presence of pretrends among states adopting RTW laws, and to comparing individuals on the borders of states with and without RTW laws. These

results affect how one thinks about the role of unions in the modern economy. Dating back to early work such as Freeman (1976, 1980) that formalizes a hypothesis in Hirschman (1970), the conventional wisdom was that unions provide employees a way of expressing their voice without requiring them to exit from undesirable employment situations. While the data do not enable me to unambiguously pinpoint the mechanism behind the main effects, they allow me to rule out several potential mechanisms, including income effects arising from not having to pay union dues, composition effects arising from the change in union membership, and contemporaneous probusiness policies accompanying the passage of RTW laws. However, **I find some evidence that the passage of RTW laws is associated with improvements in workplace practices and that the main effects are concentrated in the private sector. Although not conclusive, these results are consistent with the view that RTW laws increase competition and, in turn, encourage unions to provide greater value to their members.** Further research is needed to see whether these patterns in well-being continue among union workers in RTW states in years to come.

Right to work state are able to increase jobs and investment, as well as make it so workers do not have to join unions which may not serve their best interests, as unions have prioritized seniority over productivity throughout many negotiations.

Sherk, 11 [James Sherk is a research fellow of labor economics at Heritage, Published: 11/9/1, “Right to Work Increases Jobs and Choices”, Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/right-work-increases-jobs-and-choices>] /Triumph Debate

Increased Investment in Right-to-Work States **Right-to-work states are much more attractive for businesses investment. Unionized firms earn lower profits, invest less, and create fewer jobs than comparable nonunion firms.**^[6] **Boeing’s decision to build a new plant in South Carolina—a right-to-work state—illustrates a larger trend. Businesses consider the presence (or absence) of a right-to-work law a major factor when deciding where to locate.**^[7] It was no accident that foreign automobile brands located their U.S. plants primarily in right-to-work states like Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Research suggests that foreign direct investment in Oklahoma and Idaho increased after these states passed right-to-work laws.^[8] **More Jobs States that attract more investment should create more jobs. In fact, right-to-work states have lower unemployment rates (9.2 percent) than states without right-to-work laws (9.9 percent).**^[9] However, right-to-work states exist predominantly in the South and West. Their lower unemployment rates could simply reflect regional differences. To get around this problem, researchers have studied neighboring counties on state borders with and without right-to-work laws. **Such counties share the same geography and economic environment, but their main difference is the presence of a right-to-work law on one side of the border. The share of manufacturing jobs in counties in right-to-work states is one-third higher than in adjacent counties in non-right-to-work states.**^[10] Right-to-work laws attract jobs. Wage Effects Small Economic theory does not predict how right-to-work laws affect wages. **Unions restrict the supply of jobs in unionized companies. This reduces the pay of nonunion workers—they do not have as many good job opportunities—while raising the wages of union members.** The additional business investment a right-to-work law attracts usually raises the demand for labor, increasing wages. **Yet unions argue that businesses will cut wages if the risk of union organizing falls. These factors largely cancel each other. Most studies show that right-to-work laws have little effect on wages in either direction.**^[11] Right-to-work states do have lower average wages than non-right-to-work states, but this is because they are located primarily in the South, which was once much less developed than the North and still has a lower cost of living. Research controlling for this shows that workers in right-to-work states have, if anything, slightly higher wages.^[12] Members-Only Contracts Permissible **In a free society, workers should not have to financially support organizations they oppose. Unions justify forced dues by arguing that the law requires them to represent non-members. They argue that right-to-work laws allow workers to free-ride off of union contracts—enjoying the benefits without paying the costs. This interprets the law selectively. Unions do not have to represent workers who do not pay dues. They can negotiate contracts that apply only to their members. The law requires unions to represent nonmembers only if they negotiate as “exclusive bargaining representatives.”**^[13] That status lets them negotiate on behalf of all workers, union and nonunion alike. If they do so, the law requires unions to bargain fairly. They cannot selectively negotiate the minimum wage for nonmembers. But unions do not have to claim exclusive representative status; they could negotiate contracts covering only dues-paying members. Unions almost never do this. **They prefer exclusive representative status because it enables them to get a better contract for their supporters. Consider seniority systems: They ensure that everyone gets raises and promotions at the same rate, irrespective of individual performance. If a union negotiated a members-only contract**

with a seniority system, high-performing workers would refuse to join. Those workers would negotiate a separate contract with performance pay. **The best workers would get ahead faster, leaving less money and fewer positions available for those on the seniority scale. The union wants everyone in the seniority system—especially those it holds back. In non-right-to-work states, the law allows unions to force nonmembers to accept the union contract. The law should not force workers who are disadvantaged by these contracts to pay union dues.** Unions could choose to represent only their members. Forced Unionization Is Not an American Value The government should not force workers to pay for unwanted union representation. In a free society, workers alone should make that choice. **Right-to-work laws also make good economic sense. They reduce the incentive for union organizers to target companies that treat their workers well. Since unions hurt businesses, less aggressive union organizing attracts investment—and jobs. However, right-to-work laws appear to have little effect on wages. Lawmakers considering right-to-work proposals should ignore the union movement’s self-interested opposition. Unions could negotiate contracts that apply only to their members—they simply prefer not to. Unions should not be able to force workers to choose between financially supporting them and losing their jobs.**

A/2 Strikes / Unions

The reduction of trade barriers and other protectionist policies have reduced unions, and resulted in decreased negotiating power for labor, regardless of the ability to strike.

Phillips 15 [Matt Phillips covers financial markets at the New York Times. Before joining The New York Times in 2018, he was editor in chief at Vice Money and a founding staffer at Quartz, Published: 2/11/15, “American labor-union strikes are almost completely extinct”, Quartz, <https://qz.com/342311/american-workers-have-pretty-much-stopped-using-their-most-powerful-weapon/>] /Triumph Debate

“Unions really had tremendous bargaining power because they represented most of the people in the major productive industry and most of the people in the highly skilled industries.” says Charles Craver, a law professor at George Washington University and former labor attorney. **So what changed? A lot. American industry—a traditional bastion of strength for unions—has shrunk as a share of the overall economy. The decline of trade barriers and the rise of globalization made it easier for companies to outsource jobs. And employers have become much more aggressive and effective on countering the growth of unions. The result? Private sector union membership has declined precipitously. At the end of 2014, it was roughly 6.6%. Back in 1983 it was roughly 17%. In the 1950s, it hovered around 30%.** (Today, US labor union strength is centered in the public sector, where roughly 36% of workers were in unions in 2014.) Now, if there’s any good news for American unions, it’s that perhaps their bleakest days are behind them. America’s job market is improving, and traditionally that bolsters the position of organized labor. **Labor activities around the West Coast ports as well as US oil refineries are in the news. And perhaps most heartening for union supporters, public opinion towards organized labor has bounced back a bit, with about 51% of Americans now saying they had a favorable view of unions, the highest favorability rating since 2007. Unfortunately, that’s still far below 63% of Americans who viewed unions favorably back in 2001.**

Attempts by unions to raise wages and benefits have only served to increase the price of products on all, reduce the number of jobs, and then are rolled back when the business nears closing, providing no long term benefit.

Sherk, 09 [James Sherk is a research fellow of labor economics at Heritage, Published: 5/21/09, "What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the Economy", Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy>] /Triumph Debate

Unions argue that they can raise their members' wages, but few Americans understand the economic theory explaining how they do this. Unions are labor cartels. Cartels work by restricting the supply of what they produce so that consumers will have to pay higher prices for it. OPEC, the best-known cartel, attempts to raise the price of oil by cutting oil production. As labor cartels, unions attempt to monopolize the labor supplied to a company or an industry in order to force employers to pay higher wages.[4] In this respect, they function like any other cartel and have the same effects on the economy. **Cartels benefit their members in the short run and harm the overall economy.** Imagine that General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler jointly agreed to raise the price of the cars they sold by \$2,000: Their profits would rise as every American who bought a car paid more. **Some Americans would no longer be able to afford a car at the higher price, so the automakers would manufacture and sell fewer vehicles. Then they would need--and hire--fewer workers.** The Detroit automakers' stock prices would rise, but the overall economy would suffer. **That is why federal anti-trust laws prohibit cartels and the automakers cannot collude to raise prices.** Now consider how the United Auto Workers (UAW)--the union representing the autoworkers in Detroit--functions. **Before the current downturn, the UAW routinely went on strike unless the Detroit automakers paid what they demanded-- until recently, \$70 an hour in wages and benefits.** Gold-plated UAW health benefits for retirees and active workers added \$1,200 to the cost of each vehicle that GM produced in 2007.[5] Other benefits, such as full retirement after 30 years of employment and the recently eliminated JOBS bank (which paid workers for not working), added more. **Some of these costs come out of profits, and some get passed to consumers through higher prices. UAW members earn higher wages, but every American who buys a car pays more, stock owners' wealth falls, and some Americans can no longer afford to buy a new car. The automakers also hire fewer workers because they now make and sell fewer cars. Unions raise the wages of their members both by forcing consumers to pay more for what they buy or do without and by costing some workers their jobs. They have the same harmful effect on the economy as other cartels, despite benefiting some workers instead of stock owners.** That is why the federal anti-trust laws exempt labor unions; otherwise, anti-monopoly statutes would also prohibit union activity. Unions' role as monopoly cartels explains their opposition to trade and competition. A cartel can charge higher prices only as long as it remains a monopoly. **If consumers can buy elsewhere, a company must cut its prices or go out of business. This has happened to the UAW. Non-union workers at Honda and Toyota plants now produce high-quality cars at lower prices than are possible in Detroit. As consumers have voted with their feet, the Detroit automakers have been brought to the brink of bankruptcy. The UAW has now agreed to significant concessions that will eliminate a sizeable portion of the gap between UAW and non-union wages.** With competition, the union cartel breaks down, and unions cannot force consumers to pay higher prices or capture higher wages for their members.

The existence of unions reduces research and development, harming businesses in the long run, result in newer employees being more likely to lose their job, and result in longer economic recoveries as growth is slowed.

Sherk, 09 [James Sherk is a research fellow of labor economics at Heritage, Published: 5/21/09, "What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the Economy", Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy>] /Triumph Debate

Unions Reduce Investment In essence, unions "tax" investments that corporations make, redistributing part of the return from these investments to their members. This makes undertaking a new investment less worthwhile. Companies respond to the union tax in the same way they respond to government taxes on investment--by investing less. By cutting profits, unions also reduce the money that firms have available for new investments, so they also indirectly reduce investment.

Consider General Motors, now on the verge of bankruptcy. The UAW agreed to concessions in the 2007 contracts and has made more concessions since then. If General Motors had invested successfully in producing an inexpensive electric car, and if sales of that new vehicle had made GM profitable, then the UAW would not have agreed to any concessions. The UAW would be demanding higher wages. **After the union tax, R&D investments earn lower returns for GM than for its non-union competitors such as Toyota and Honda.**

Economic research demonstrates overwhelmingly that unionized firms invest less in both physical capital and intangible R&D than non-union firms do.[20] One study found that unions directly reduce capital investment by 6 percent and indirectly reduce capital investment through lower profits by another 7 percent. This same study also found that unions reduce R&D activity by 15 percent to 20 percent.[21] Other studies find that unions reduce R&D

spending by even larger amounts.[22] **Research shows that unions directly cause firms to reduce their investments. In fact, investment drops sharply after unions organize a company. One study found that unionizing reduces capital investment by 30 percent--the same effect as a 33 percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate.**[23] Unions Reduce Jobs Lower investment obviously hinders the competitiveness of unionized firms. The Detroit automakers have done so poorly in the recent economic downturn in part because they invested far less than their non-union competitors in researching and developing fuel-efficient vehicles. **When the price of gas jumped to \$4 a gallon, consumers shifted away from SUVs to hybrids, leaving the Detroit carmakers unable to compete and costing many UAW members their jobs.**

Economists would expect reduced investment, coupled with the intentional effort of the union cartel to reduce employment, to cause unions to reduce jobs in the companies they organize. Economic research shows exactly this: Over the long term, unionized jobs disappear.

Consider the manufacturing industry. Most Americans take it as fact that manufacturing jobs have decreased over the past 30 years. However, that is not fully accurate. Chart 1 shows manufacturing employment for union and non-union workers. Unionized manufacturing jobs fell by 75 percent between 1977 and 2008. Non-union manufacturing employment increased by 6 percent over that time. In the aggregate, only unionized manufacturing jobs have disappeared from the economy. As a result, collective bargaining coverage fell from 38 percent of manufacturing workers to 12 percent over those years. Manufacturing jobs have fallen in both sectors since 2000, but non-union workers have fared much better: 38 percent of unionized manufacturing jobs have disappeared since 2000, compared to 18 percent of non-union jobs.[24] Other industries experienced similar shifts. Chart 2 shows union and non-union employment in the construction industry. Unlike the manufacturing sector, the construction industry has grown considerably since the late 1970s. However, in the aggregate, that growth has occurred exclusively in non-union jobs, expanding 159 percent since 1977. Unionized construction jobs fell by 17 percent. As a result, union coverage fell from 38 percent to 16 percent of all construction workers between 1977 and 2008.[25] This pattern holds across many industries: **Between new companies starting up and existing companies expanding, non-union jobs grow by roughly 3 percent each year, while 3 percent of union jobs disappear.**[26] **In the long term, unionized jobs disappear and unions need to replenish their membership by organizing new firms. Union jobs have disappeared especially quickly in industries where unions win the highest relative**

share of the market.

Unions Reduce Investment In essence, unions "tax" investments that corporations make, redistributing part of the return from these investments to their members. This makes undertaking a new investment less worthwhile. Companies respond to the union tax in the same way they respond to government taxes on investment--by investing less. By cutting profits, unions also reduce the money that firms have available for new investments, so they also indirectly reduce investment.

wages.^[27] **Widespread unionization reduces employment opportunities.** More Contractions but Not More Bankruptcies Counterintuitively, research shows that unions do not make companies more likely to go bankrupt.

Unionized firms do not go out of business at higher rates than non-union firms.^[28] **Unionized firms do, however, shed jobs more frequently and expand less frequently than non-union firms.**^[29] **Most studies show that jobs contract or grow more slowly, by between 3 and 4 percentage points a year, in unionized businesses than they do in non-unionized**

businesses.^[30] How can union firms both lose jobs at faster rates than non-union firms and have no greater likelihood of going out of business? Unions try not to ruin the companies they organize. They agree to concessions at distressed firms to keep them afloat. **However, unions prefer layoffs over pay cuts when a firm does not face imminent**

liquidation. Layoffs at most union firms occur on the basis of seniority: Newer hires lose their jobs before workers with more tenure lose theirs. Senior members with the greatest influence in the union know that they will keep their jobs in the event of layoffs but that they will also suffer pay reductions. Consequently, unions negotiate contracts that allow firms to lay off newer hires and keep pay high for senior members instead of contracts that lower wages for all workers and preserve jobs.^[31] Economists expect unions to behave like this. They are cartels that work by keeping employment down to raise wages for their members. Consider General Motors. GM shed tens of thousands of jobs over the past decade, but the UAW steadfastly refused to any concessions that would have improved GM's competitive standing. Only **in 2007--with the company on the brink of bankruptcy--did the UAW agree to lower wages, and then only for new hires. The UAW accepted steep job losses as the price of keeping wages high for senior members. If GM does file for bankruptcy, it will likely emerge as a smaller but more competitive firm. It will still exist and employ union members--but tens of thousands of UAW members have lost their jobs.** Unions Cause Job Losses The balance of economic research shows that unions do not just happen to organize firms with more layoffs and less job growth: They cause job losses. Most studies find that jobs drop at newly organized companies, with employment falling between 5 percent and 10 percent.^[32] One prominent study comparing workers who voted narrowly for unionizing with those who voted narrowly against unionizing came to the opposite conclusion, finding that newly organized companies were no more likely to shed jobs or go out of business.^[33] That study, however--prominently cited by labor advocates--essentially found that unions have no effect on the workplace. Jobs did not disappear, but wages did not rise either. Unless the labor movement wants to concede that unions do not raise wages, it cannot use this research to argue that unions do not cost jobs. Slower Economic Recovery Labor cartels attempt to reduce the number of jobs in an industry in order to raise the wages of their members. **Unions cut into corporate profitability, also reducing business investment and employment over the long term. These effects do not help the job market during normal economic circumstances, and they cause particular harm during recessions. Economists have found that unions delay economic recoveries. States with more union members took considerably longer than those with fewer union members to recover from the 1982 and 1991 recessions.**^[34] Policies designed to expand union membership whether workers want it or not--such as the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act--will delay the recovery. Economic research has demonstrated that policies adopted to encourage union membership in the 1930s deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act. He also permitted industries to collude to reduce output and raise prices--but only if the companies in that industry unionized and paid above-market wages. This policy of cartelizing both labor and businesses caused over half of the economic losses that occurred in the 1930s.^[35] Encouraging labor cartels will also lengthen the current recession.

Unions cut into corporate profitability, also reducing business investment and employment over the long term. These effects do not help the job market during normal economic circumstances, and they cause particular harm during recessions. Economists have found that unions delay economic recoveries. States with more union members took considerably longer than those with fewer union members to recover from the 1982 and 1991 recessions.^[34] Policies designed to expand union membership whether workers want it or not--such as the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act--will delay the recovery. Economic research has demonstrated that policies adopted to encourage union membership in the 1930s deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act. He also permitted industries to collude to reduce output and raise prices--but only if the companies in that industry unionized and paid above-market wages. This policy of cartelizing both labor and businesses caused over half of the economic losses that occurred in the 1930s.^[35] Encouraging labor cartels will also lengthen the current recession.

Unions cut into corporate profitability, also reducing business investment and employment over the long term. These effects do not help the job market during normal economic circumstances, and they cause particular harm during recessions. Economists have found that unions delay economic recoveries. States with more union members took considerably longer than those with fewer union members to recover from the 1982 and 1991 recessions.^[34] Policies designed to expand union membership whether workers want it or not--such as the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act--will delay the recovery. Economic research has demonstrated that policies adopted to encourage union membership in the 1930s deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act. He also permitted industries to collude to reduce output and raise prices--but only if the companies in that industry unionized and paid above-market wages. This policy of cartelizing both labor and businesses caused over half of the economic losses that occurred in the 1930s.^[35] Encouraging labor cartels will also lengthen the current recession.

Unions cut into corporate profitability, also reducing business investment and employment over the long term. These effects do not help the job market during normal economic circumstances, and they cause particular harm during recessions. Economists have found that unions delay economic recoveries. States with more union members took considerably longer than those with fewer union members to recover from the 1982 and 1991 recessions.^[34] Policies designed to expand union membership whether workers want it or not--such as the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act--will delay the recovery. Economic research has demonstrated that policies adopted to encourage union membership in the 1930s deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act. He also permitted industries to collude to reduce output and raise prices--but only if the companies in that industry unionized and paid above-market wages. This policy of cartelizing both labor and businesses caused over half of the economic losses that occurred in the 1930s.^[35] Encouraging labor cartels will also lengthen the current recession.

Unions cut into corporate profitability, also reducing business investment and employment over the long term. These effects do not help the job market during normal economic circumstances, and they cause particular harm during recessions. Economists have found that unions delay economic recoveries. States with more union members took considerably longer than those with fewer union members to recover from the 1982 and 1991 recessions.^[34] Policies designed to expand union membership whether workers want it or not--such as the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act--will delay the recovery. Economic research has demonstrated that policies adopted to encourage union membership in the 1930s deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act. He also permitted industries to collude to reduce output and raise prices--but only if the companies in that industry unionized and paid above-market wages. This policy of cartelizing both labor and businesses caused over half of the economic losses that occurred in the 1930s.^[35] Encouraging labor cartels will also lengthen the current recession.

The prioritization of wages by unions results in increased prices, reduced productivity, and artificially high employment. The right to strike is the way they control the labor supply, resulting in these consequences.

Reisman, 14 [George Reisman is is Pepperdine University Professor Emeritus of Economics and the author of Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics, Published: 9/7/14, “How Labor Unions Hurt Workers”, Mises Institute, <https://mises.org/library/how-labor-unions-hurt-workers>] /Triumph Debate

Many Americans, perhaps a substantial majority, still believe that, irrespective of any problems they may have caused, labor unions are fundamentally an institution that exists in the vital self-interest of wage earners. Indeed, many believe that it is labor unions that stand between the average wage earner and a life of subsistence wages, exhausting hours of work, and horrific working conditions. Labor unions and the general public almost totally ignore the essential role played by falling prices in achieving rising real wages. They see only the rise in money wages as worthy of consideration. Indeed, in our environment of chronic inflation, prices that actually do fall are relatively rare. Nevertheless, the only thing that can explain a rise in real wages throughout the economic system is a fall in prices relative to wages. **And the only thing that achieves this is an increase in production per worker. More production per worker — a higher productivity of labor — serves to increase the supply of goods and services produced relative to the supply of labor that produces them.** In this way, it reduces prices relative to wages and thereby raises real wages and the general standard of living. What raises money wages throughout the economic system is not what is responsible for the rise in real wages. Increases in money wages are essentially the result just of the increase in the quantity of money and resulting increase in the overall volume of spending in the economic system. **In the absence of a rising productivity of labor, the increase in money and spending would operate to raise prices by as much or more than it raised wages.** This outcome is prevented only by the fact that at the same time that the quantity of money and volume of spending are increasing, the output per worker is also increasing, with the result that prices rise by less than wages. A fall in prices is still present in the form of prices being lower than they would have been had only an increase in the quantity of money and volume of spending been operative. **With relatively minor exceptions, real wages throughout the economic system simply do not rise from the side of higher money wages.** Essentially, they rise only from the side of a greater supply of goods and services relative to the supply of labor and thus from prices being lower relative to wages. **The truth is that the means by which the standard of living of the individual wage earner and the individual businessman and capitalist is increased, and the means by which that of the average wage earner in the economic system is increased, are very different. For the individual, it is the earning of more money. For the average wage earner in the economic system, it is the payment of lower prices.** What this discussion shows is that the increase in money wages that labor unions seek is not at all the source of rising real wages and that the source of rising real wages is in fact a rising productivity of labor, which always operates from the side of falling prices, not rising money wages. Indeed, **the efforts of labor unions to raise money wages are profoundly opposed to the goal of raising real wages and the standard of living. When the unions seek to raise the standard of living of their members by means of raising their money wages, their policy inevitably comes down to an attempt to make the labor of their members artificially scarce.** That is their only means of raising the wages of their members. The unions do not have much actual power over the demand for labor. But they often achieve considerable power over the supply of labor. And their actual technique for raising wages is to make the supply of labor, at least in the

particular industry or occupation that a given union is concerned with, as scarce as possible.

Thus, whenever they can, unions attempt to gain control over entry into the labor market. They seek to impose apprenticeship programs, or to have licensing requirements imposed by the government. Such measures are for the purpose of holding down the supply of labor in the field and thereby enabling those fortunate enough to be admitted to it, to earn higher incomes. Even when the unions do not succeed in directly reducing the supply of labor, the imposition of their above-market wage demands still has the effect of reducing the number of jobs offered in the field and thus the supply of labor in the field that is able to find work. **The artificial wage increases imposed by the labor unions result in**

unemployment when above-market wages are imposed throughout the economic system.

This situation exists when it is possible for unions to be formed easily. If, as in the present-day

United States, all that is required is for a majority of workers in an establishment to decide that they wish to be represented by a union, then the wages imposed by the unions will be effective even in the nonunion fields. Employers in the nonunion fields will feel compelled to offer their workers wages comparable to what the union workers are receiving — indeed, possibly even still higher wages — in order to ensure that they do not unionize. Widespread wage increases closing large numbers of workers out of numerous occupations put extreme pressure on the wage rates of whatever areas of the economic system may still remain open.

These limited areas could absorb the overflow of workers from other lines at low enough wage rates. But minimum-wage laws prevent wage rates in these remaining lines from going low enough to absorb these workers. From the perspective of most of those lucky enough to keep their jobs, the most serious consequence of the unions is the holding down or outright reduction of the productivity of labor. **With few exceptions, the labor unions openly combat the rise in the**

productivity of labor. They do so virtually as a matter of principle. They oppose the introduction of labor-saving machinery on the grounds that it causes unemployment. They

oppose competition among workers. As Henry Hazlitt pointed out, they force employers to tolerate featherbedding

practices, such as the classic requirement that firemen, whose function was to shovel coal on steam locomotives, be retained on

diesel locomotives. **They impose make-work schemes, such as requiring that pipe delivered to**

construction sites with screw thread already on it, have its ends cut off and new screw thread

cut on the site. They impose narrow work classifications, and require that specialists be

employed at a day's pay to perform work that others could easily do — for example, requiring

the employment of a plasterer to repair the incidental damage done to a wall by an

electrician, which the electrician himself could easily repair. To anyone who understands the role of the

productivity of labor in raising real wages, it should be obvious that the unions' policy of combating the rise in the productivity of

labor renders them in fact a leading enemy of the rise in real wages. However radical this conclusion may seem, however much at

odds it is with the prevailing view of the unions as the leading source of the rise in real wages over the last hundred and fifty years or

more, the fact is that in combating the rise in the productivity of labor, the unions actively combat the rise in real wages! **Far**

from being responsible for improvements in the standard of living of the average worker,

labor unions operate in more or less total ignorance of what actually raises the average

worker's standard of living. In consequence of their ignorance, they are responsible for

artificial inequalities in wage rates, for unemployment, and for holding down real wages and

the average worker's standard of living. All of these destructive, antisocial consequences

derive from the fact that while individuals increase the money they earn through increasing

production and the overall supply of goods and services, thereby reducing prices and raising

real wages throughout the economic system, labor unions increase the money paid to their

members by exactly the opposite means. They reduce the supply and productivity of labor and

so reduce the supply and raise the prices of the goods and services their members help to

produce, thereby reducing real wages throughout the economic system.

Strikes have become less effective due to globalization and the fear of losing one's job in the long term.

Tahmincioglu, '10 [Eve Tahmincioglu is a writer for NBC News, Published: 9/6/10, "In tough economy, labor strikes are losing ground" NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38992400>] /Triumph Debate

When Karl Fendelander, 27, got one of his first real jobs as a warehouse worker for a manufacturing company in Reno, Nev., a lot of people were giving him dirty looks at work. He was sent there by a temp agency and was unaware that the bulk of facility's regular workers were on strike. At the end of his shift, an older employee told him about the work stoppage and suggested, strongly, that he not return. "I read about scabs and strikes in high school, but I didn't know this was something that happened in contemporary settings often," said Fendelander, who heeded the worker's recommendation. **Indeed, labor strikes — seen as one of the key bargaining chips unions have had to get good wages and working conditions from employers — some day may end up only in history books.** **Not great news after Labor Day weekend, when we're supposed to be celebrating the social and economic achievements of working stiffs everywhere. The number of major U.S. strikes, including those involving 1,000 workers or more, fell to just five in 2009, the lowest level since 1947,** when the Department of Labor first began tracking the data. "The bottom line is that unions know the strike weapon just doesn't work that well anymore, especially in a tough economy," said Phillip Wilson, president of the Labor Relations Institute. **The decline of the strike, however, didn't just start with this recession. As the economy has become more globalized over the last few decades and the stream of jobs going overseas to lower labor cost nations, "employees have become more fearful of losing their jobs and less willing to call a strike to begin with,"** said John Budd, program director of the Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies at the Carlson School of Management. Employers have also become more aggressive in bringing in replacement workers, he added, and adding to the problem is the growth of the temporary work force in this country. **"All these factors have conspired against unions and workers in terms of the viability of the strike," he maintained. The attitude nationally, he said, has largely "moved to the individual and not group solidarity."**

Unions have continually opposed mandates, even if their member support them. This is due to an insistence on the right to bargain in regards to their implementation, delaying them as a result.

Hirsch, '21 [Jeffrey Hirsch is a Professor of Law at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , Published: 11/9/21, "Why so many unions oppose vaccine mandates" Quartz, <https://qz.com/2086910/why-vaccine-mandates-are-being-opposed-by-unions/>] /Triumph Debate

Unions have to represent their members. **Police unions have been most vocally opposed to vaccine mandates. They've filed lawsuits, vowed to ignore the mandate and threatened to quit, even though COVID-19 has been the leading cause of death for police officers in 2020 and 2021.** **Although it's unclear exactly how many police officers and their unions are opposing mandates, their vaccination numbers are well below the national rate for adults, and there have been very hostile objections to mandates in cities across the country.** For example, the Chicago police union president urged officers to defy a vaccine mandate that he compared to a Nazi gas chamber. It's important to understand that unions are representative organizations that rely on the support of their members, much like politicians. **A union only gains a foothold at a workplace if a majority of employees want it; if the union loses that majority support, it can be kicked out. Moreover, union leaders obtain and keep their positions through periodic elections. As a result, unions are especially sensitive to the positions of their members. And that's not only to maintain support, it's also unions' main job: representing employees. So if a union represents workers who oppose vaccine mandates, it shouldn't come as a surprise that union leaders, who are usually former rank-and-file employees, echo the same view.** This is why we see so many unions that represent law enforcement officers and firefighters, who tend to be politically conservative, oppose vaccine mandates. Protecting the right to bargain Yet even unions that traditionally support the Democratic Party aren't always gung-ho about mandates, especially those that are implemented without their input. While some large unions, like the AFL-CIO and National Education Association, quickly backed vaccine mandates, others have taken a more nuanced stance. As Terri Gerstein from the Harvard Labor and Worklife Program emphasized, it's important to pay attention to exactly what these unions are doing and saying. **Many unions initially expressed caution or opposition to vaccine mandates, but that reluctance has frequently softened over time. Thus, we see some unions that have always encouraged its members to vaccinate, like the American Federation of Teachers, first oppose employer-led mandates before reversing course, all the while emphasizing the need for more discussion between workers and management.** The American Federation of Government Employees is encouraging its members to be vaccinated but has emphasized that any requirements first be "properly negotiated with our bargaining units." The Service Employees International Union also pushed for members to get the vaccine, while arguing that employers may be legally required to bargain with unions before implementing mandates. **Although these stances may seem odd, they're exactly what you should expect. When a policy that affects workers is first proposed, unions may need some time to gauge their members' thoughts. Hence the initial hesitation. After that, however, unions focus on protecting one of their members' vital labor rights: the right to bargain. A major reason employees want a union in the first place is get a seat at the table with their employer to hash out work conditions. Employers usually can't change work conditions on their own because they have a duty to try to work out an agreement with the union. Therefore, when the possibility of a vaccine mandate arises, a union—even one that supports the mandate—will be very careful to make sure the employer bargains before implementing it.** Although some state courts and agencies have recently determined that state and local government employers aren't required to negotiate with unions over vaccine mandates because it's an urgent health emergency, it's still an open question in the private sector. As a result, a union's failure to at least push for the right to bargain over a mandate would be giving up one of its most powerful rights without a fight.

Ironing out the details But even when its members generally support a mandate and an employer is allowed to impose one, a union may still have an incentive to avoid publicly supporting the mandate. That's because it will still want to reserve the right to bargain over the mandate's implementation. **The duty to bargain includes not only the adoption of a rule but also negotiations over how the rule is implemented.** For instance, **Tyson Foods and its unions agreed to a mandate that included incentives for vaccinations, such as paid leave. And the US Postal Service and its unions are negotiating how to address the new rule that obligates employers with 100 or more employees to either require workers be vaccinated or take regular COVID-19 tests. Terms include deadlines for compliance, whether the Postal Service will provide on-site testing or vaccinations, and how employees who don't comply will be disciplined.** Questions over whether disciplinary action can be challenged recently led an Illinois court to temporarily prevent Chicago from enforcing its vaccination requirement for police officers. The delay was needed, according to the court, to allow unvaccinated officers time to challenge suspensions through the arbitration process that was part of their union's contract with the city.

TRIUMPH DEBATE

SUPPLEMENTAL FILE

PUBLISHED BY TRIUMPH DEBATE LLC, PO
BOX 3057, AKRON, OH 44309.

PRODUCED & EDITED BY KATIE HUMPHRIES,
MATTHEW SLENCSAK, AND IAN MIKKELSEN.

FOR INQUIRIES, PLEASE EMAIL
TRIUMPHDEBATE@GMAIL.COM
OR CALL 234-206-1250.