Consequentialism

Here, we have a few different options for consequential frameworks. A lot of them use the same/similar cards, but may serve different purposes.

The first framework we outline is if you’re really trying to justify consequentialism, and are worried you may lose that debate – 

Insert whatever value is most applicable to the topic or you prefer to run. Justice, morality or societal welfare work best with this criterion.

Governments must be consequential in nature. Woller 97 explain

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group’s gains must come at another group’s expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle[s]. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers’ duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their policies are somehow to the overall advantage of society.

Thus the value criterion is maximizing expected wellbeing. Consequentialism is the default moral theory. This means you presume the neg framework. Sinott-Armstrong 11 write

Even if consequentialists can accommodate or explain away common moral intuitions, that might seem only to answer objections without yet giving any positive reason to accept consequentialism. However, most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can. The question then is only whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989, 1998) If no objection reveals any need for anything beyond consequences, then consequences alone seem to determine what is morally right or wrong, just as consequentialists claim.
The second framework we outline is if you are trying to show that nations have an obligation to other nations/citizens. 

Insert whatever value is most applicable to the topic or you prefer to run. Justice, morality or societal welfare work best with this criterion.

Governments must be consequential in nature. Woller 97 explain

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group’s gains must come at another group’s expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle[s]. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers’ duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their policies are somehow to the overall advantage of society.

And Peter Singer of Princeton University 1993 writes

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. In accepting that ethical judgments must be made from a universal point of view, I am accepting that my own interests cannot, simply because they are my interests, count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my very natural concern that my own interests be looked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the interests of others. Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected.

Thus, my value criterion is maximizing expected well-being.

The third framework we outline allows you to debate consequentialism either under a rights-based paradigm, or include discussion of rights under your framework, allowing you to weigh under your opponents case, or pre-empt common attacks against consequentialism.

Insert whatever value is most applicable to the topic or you prefer to run. Justice, morality or societal welfare work best with this criterion.

Governments must be consequential in nature. Woller 97 explains

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group’s gains must come at another group’s expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle[s]. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers’ duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their policies are somehow to the overall advantage of society.

Thus because policies must be to the overall advantage of society the value criterion is maximizing expected well-being. Lastly rights require the utilitarian calculus to determine their relative importance.

Richard Brandt professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan 1992 writes

Before turning to possible ” deeper” difficulties, let me make just one point favorable to the utilitarian view, that it tells us, in principle, how to find out what are a person’s rights, and how stringent they are, relative to each other, which is much more than can be said of most other theories, unless reliance on intuitions is supposed to be a definite way of telling what a person’s rights are. How does one do this, on the utilitarian theory? The idea, of course, is that we have to determine whether it would maximize long-range expectable utility to include recognition of certain rights in the moral code of a society, or to include a certain right with a certain degree of stringency as compared with other rights. (For instance, it might be optimistic to include a right to life with more stringency than a right to liberty and this with more stringency than the right to pursue happiness.) Suppose, for instance, one wants to know what should be the scope of the “right to life.” Then it would be proper to inquire whether the utility-maximizing moral system would require people to retrain from taking the life of other adults, more positively to support life by providing adequate medical care, to abstain from life-termination for seriously defective infants or to refrain from abortion, to require abstaining from assisting a person with terminal illness in ending his own life if he requests it, to refrain from assisting in the discharge of a sentence of capital punishment, or to refrain from killing combatants in war time and so on. If one wants to know whether the right to life is stronger than the right of free speech on political subjects, it is proper to inquire whether the utility maximizing moral code would prefer free speech to the cost of lives (and in what circumstances).

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